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Authentically Innocent:
Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes
JEFFREY

A.

MEYER*

"[J]uries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges."'
INTRODUCTION

Few ideals reign more supreme than the jury as conscience of our
community and moral arbiter of a criminal defendant's conduct. As one
leading scholar notes, juries do "more than reliable fact-finding"; they
render "normative judgment."' Accordihgly, "criminal trials are
unavoidable morality plays, focusing on the defendant's moral
blameworthiness or lack thereof," and "[n]o man who claims innocence
can be condemned as guilty unless the community, via the jury,
pronounces him worthy of moral condemnation."'
These ideals are no more than myth for most federal criminal cases
today. For a wide range of the most commonly charged federal crimes,
judges routinely instruct juries to convict defendants regardless of their
moral culpability-that is, even if there is no proof or finding that the
defendant knew she was doing something wrong. Here are a few
examples:
* An immigrant alien may be criminally convicted for unlawfully
reentering the United States even if she believed that she had
* Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University Law School (2oo6-present). Thanks to Ian
Ayres, William Dunlap, Stephen Gilles, Stanton Krauss, Andrew Levine, Elizabeth Marsh, Alexander
Meiklejohn, and Linda Ross Meyer for their review and comments on prior drafts. All errors are mine.
I. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952).
2. AKHIL

REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES

122

(1997).
3. Id. at 123; see also Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure:The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere,88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1401 (2003)
("The jury serves as the chorus of a Greek tragedy, 'the conscience of the community.' It applies the
community's moral code, pronounces judgment [and with its] solemn pronouncement of guilt
confront[ing] the offender at length with his wrongful deeds... driv[es] home in undeniable detail the
wrongfulness of the crime." (citations and footnotes omitted)): Daryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning,
Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes. 96
MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1207-o8 (1998) ("a guilty verdict is at bottom a moral assessment of

blameworthiness" and "the verdict serves criminal law's expressive function of assessing the moral
quality of his judgment, and thereby his character").
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proper governmental approval to return.'
A defendant charged with felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm may
be convicted even if mistaken about his felony history (e.g., he
had been previously assured by a court that he did not have a
felony history or he believed that his prior conviction had never
formally been entered or had been expunged).'
" A defendant charged with criminal possession of an unregistered
firearm may be convicted even if he mistakenly thought the
firearm was registered as required.6
* A defendant charged with illegal disposal of toxic waste may be
convicted even if she is ignorant of the waste's toxic qualities or
even if she thought that her employer had a proper permit to
allow disposal.'
The problem I describe arises with regulatory or public order crimes,
which include drug trafficking, weapons, immigration, and environmental
offenses. They are usually general intent crimes, defined by Congress
without identifying precisely what the prosecution must prove a
defendant knew or intended. General intent crimes differ from specific
intent crimes for which Congress requires proof of a defendant's intent to
do something wrong or otherwise to violate the law (e.g., conspiracy,
wire fraud, mail fraud, or money laundering). Today, regulatory crimes
are the bread-and-butter of a federal prosecutor's docket-about 70% of
crimes charged in the federal courts-and their share of the docket is
8
growing.
Ironically, despite the types of case examples set forth above
involving the conviction of blameless defendants, the Supreme Court has
vowed not to interpret general intent statutes to "criminalize a broad
range of apparently innocent conduct."9 Under this interpretive rule of
"apparent innocence," "a scienter requirement should apply to each of
the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct."'"
This standard requires a judge to conduct an element-by-element review
of a criminal statute to consider which of the element facts, if known to a
hypothetical defendant, would mean that a defendant knew her conduct
was not innocent. The judge then applies the statute to require proof that
a defendant knew these "wrongful" facts. Importantly, a defendant need
not know the law charged against her. Nor need the defendant be proved
to have known additionalelement facts that a court deems extraneous to
*

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
io.

See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part I.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,426 (1985).
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.. 513 U.S. 64,72 0994).
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knowledge of wrongdoing. "The presumption in favor of scienter
requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent
conduct.'""
In recent years, the apparent innocence rule has displaced strict
liability rules, such as the public welfare offense doctrine, which used to
apply to general intent regulatory offenses. For this reason, many
scholars have praised the apparent innocence rule, extolling it as no less
than a rule of "mandatory culpability" that prevents the conviction of
morally blameless defendants. 2
This Article suggests the contrary. Although the apparent innocence
rule is preferable to outright strict liability, it is now apparent that it has
fallen far short in practice of ensuring mandatory culpability. Despite its
asserted purpose to protect innocence,'3 the apparent innocence rule has
quietly allowed the conviction of a wide range of blameless defendants
for crimes that are among the most commonly charged in our federal
courts today.
Why has the apparent innocence rule failed? Because of its method
that reposes too much authority in judges, rather than juries, to decide
what knowledge is "wrongful." The rule tasks judges with deciding as a
blanket matter of statutory interpretation which of the element facts of
ii. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (200o) (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72).
12. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Criminal
Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1999) (describing and praising the apparent innocence
approach as "a method of statutory construction that [he calls] the rule of mandatory culpability" and
that is "an important and welcome development" over the traditional public welfare doctrine); see
Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea
Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. GRuM. L. REV. 859. 888 (1999) (praising apparent innocence rule as
"breath[ing] new life into [the Court's] oft-repeated view that mens rea is an essential part of criminal
law"); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionalityand Federalization,91 VA. L. REV. 879, 889 (20o5) (noting
that "[tihe Supreme Court has a satisfactory record-lately, at least-of construing federal statutes to
exempt morally blameless conduct from criminal condemnation" and that it "uses heightened mens rea
requirements to hard-wire into the definition of the crime judicially enforceable protections for
blameless conduct"); cf Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fitthe Punishment.51 EMORY L. J. 753,
756-63, 842-47 (2002) (approving results reached by the "apparent innocence" cases but critiquing
Wiley and arguing that the result of these cases is explained by the Supreme Court's wish to avoid
incarceration of a defendant who did not know he was doing wrong); Note, The New Rule of Lenity,
S19 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2434-35 (2006) (describing apparent innocence rule as part of a "new rule of
lenity" generally applied by the Rehnquist Court when confronted with ambiguous statutes).
13. A blameless defendant does not know that her conduct violated either a particular law or a
societal standard that she believed would likely be the subject of some legal prohibition. Of course,
true "moral blameworthiness" for conduct may not turn exclusively on a defendant's state of mind as
to the elements of an offense but depend instead on the existence of extenuating circumstances that
are not sufficiently severe to support a legal defense of necessity or duress-for example, the poor
mother who steals a loaf of bread to feed her hungry-but-not-starving children. This Article does not
attempt to address all such choice-of-two-evil situations in which a defendant might be said to be
morally blameless; it focuses more narrowly on the conviction of defendants who are ignorant or
misled about aspects of the elements of the offense.
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an offense, if known to a defendant, connote her wrongful knowledge.
The jury's role is correspondingly constricted. The jury does not decide
on all the facts of a case if a particular defendant knew she was doing
wrong. Instead, as to a defendant's mental state, a jury decides only if the
defendant knew particular element facts that a judge has deemed
wrongful. Because the defendant's awareness or lack of awareness of
additional facts is not required and therefore irrelevant, the jury will not
learn of this evidence, even when this additional evidence casts doubt on
whether the defendant knew she was doing wrong (for example, a jury
would not learn that an alien charged with illegal reentry believed that
she had permission to reenter the United States).
Judges' generalities about wrongfulness too often fail. Judges cannot
universally anticipate what facts, if known to a defendant, invariably
suffice to reflect awareness of wrongdoing. A court's determination that
certain conduct is not innocent is often no more than a conclusion that
the conduct is usually suspect-a conclusion that begs the ultimate
question whether a particular defendant on trial actually knew she was
doing wrong. That is the case for deported aliens who are found again in
the United States-the courts conclusively presume guilty knowledge by
relieving the prosecution from proving that the alien knew she did not
have permission to reenter the country. It is also the case for felons
charged with illegal possession of firearms-the courts conclusively
presume guilty knowledge by relieving the prosecution from proving that
the defendant knew of his prior conviction, much less that he knew the
conviction was a felony. And the same holds true for a variety of
environmental pollution offenses-the courts conclusively presume
guilty knowledge by relieving the prosecution from proving the
defendant knew she did not have a license or permit to dispose of the
waste. Moreover, even if a defendant's knowledge of certain facts
connotes some awareness of wrongdoing, such knowledge may well be of
wrongfulness that is far less serious than the type of harm actually
targeted by the statute that has been charged.
It is not simply that juries are sidelined from deciding if a defendant
knew some of the facts that legitimately bear on wrongfulness. But,
because juries are confined to considering only the defendant's
knowledge of element "facts," the apparent innocence rule also screens
out evidence of a defendant's awareness that what she did was wrong.
Consider a contrite defendant who tells the police at the scene of a crime:
"I'm terribly sorry!" This is not relevant evidence in a general intent
case, because it does not reflect the defendant's knowledge of facts.
Thus, despite its avowed purpose to screen the innocent from the guilty,
the apparent innocence rule excludes from a jury's consideration the
most straightforward evidence of a defendant's guilty conscience.
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In short, the acclaimed rule of "mandatory culpability" devolves to a
rule of "presumptive culpability" or "partial culpability." And it
perversely excludes evidence of non-facts that nonetheless signify a
defendant's awareness of wrongdoing. The apparent innocence rule does
not vindicate the innocence interests it purports to serve. And the reason
is because judges have abrogated the role of the jury to decide if
defendants knew they were doing wrong.
What is the solution? Judges should stop telling juries which facts
conclusively show guilty knowledge and stop confining juries to
considering only defendants' knowledge of these facts. Juries should be
free to consider evidence of everything a defendant knew and believed,
even facts that a defendant is proved not to have known and
circumstances that judges may not think are ordinarily suggestive of
innocence. The jury may then decide for itself if the defendant acted with
knowledge that what she did was wrong. Justice Jackson's words from a
different context ring equally true here: "[J]uries are not bound by what
seems inescapable logic to judges,"' 4 at least when it comes to deciding if
a defendant knew she was doing wrong.
The Supreme Court should replace the apparentinnocence rule with
an authentic innocence rule of jury-found culpability for general intent
crimes. An authentic innocence rule would free the jury to decide if a
defendant knew she was doing wrong. Specifically, the jury would
determine if the defendant knew she was doing the type of wrong that is
the target of the criminal statute charged against her. No longer should
juries be bound by the acontextual generalizations of judges about
wrongfulness.
Can jury-found culpability be implemented as a practical matter?
Yes-judges already have broad common law authority to determine the
manner in which they instruct juries. The fact that Congress defines
offenses does not control the manner in which courts explain the
elements of an offense to a jury. Accordingly, federal judges should first
instruct juries (as they already do today) to determine the existence of
each factual conduct element of an offense (e.g., did the defendant
reenter the country without permission?). Next, in lieu of the present
practice of selecting which facts to tell the jury that the defendant must
be proved to have known, trial courts should instruct juries to engage in a
broader inquiry: to decide if the defendant knew enough about her
conduct and the circumstances to know that she was engaged in
wrongdoing of the kind that the statute was designed to prohibit. Let the
jury decide which facts or circumstances, if known to the defendant,
crossed the threshold from "innocent" in nature to worthy of
condemnation by criminal conviction.
14. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952).
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The authentic innocence rule should be a default rule of statutory
interpretation for general intent crimes, not a rule of constitutional
dimension. If Congress wishes to impose criminal sanctions against some
defendants even if they did not know they were doing wrong, it probably
may do so.'5 Nor does an authentic innocence rule affect cases where
Congress has required specific intent-a purpose or knowledge to do
harm, to defraud, or to violate the law itself. The authentic innocence
rule is for the vast and growing majority of cases where Congress has
failed to say what a defendant must have culpably known or intended.
Authentic innocence best serves the Supreme Court's vow to protect
innocent conduct.
Today more than 95% of federal criminal cases are resolved by
guilty pleas rather than trial. 6 Jury-found culpability will doubtlessly
change prosecutors' decisions regarding which cases to charge in the first
place as well as defense counsel's advice to clients about pleading guilty
in the face of triable facts suggesting that the defendant acted without
knowledge of wrongdoing. Jury-found culpability has broad implications
for the charging, plea, and trial stages of vast numbers of federal criminal
cases.
The authentic innocence rule also comports with the Supreme
Court's general expansion of the decisional powers of criminal trial
juries. The Court has now rebuffed the notion that federal judges rather
than juries may decide certain "legal" elements at trial (such as whether
a false statement was "material').'7 Most recently, the Court has
revolutionized the jury's role to determine the full range of facts that are
mandatory to any heightened sentence that a judge may impose."
Authentic innocence can revitalize the rightful responsibility of juries to
render true culpability judgments in federal courtrooms today.
In Part I below, I survey the Supreme Court's general approach to
statutory interpretation of mens rea requirements. I illustrate the
operation of these principles in the context of a case example ("Sam and
the Bomb") involving a frequently charged federal firearms statute, and I
15. For articles suggesting constitutional limits on the authority of Congress to impose strict
liability, see Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 829 (I999), and Ann
Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL. L. REV. 391,397 (1988).
16. See Ronald Wright, Trial Distortionand the End of Innocence in Federal CriminalJustice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90-91 (2005) (reviewing statistics showing increase in federal guilty pleas to historic
high of more than 95% of cases in 2002); cf Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, i1o YALE L. J. 1097, 1099 (2OO1) ("The reigning academic
orthodoxy is preoccupied with jury trials, making them the center of attention and devoting countless
articles to them.").
17. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 5o6,522-23 (995).
18. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 86o (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
235 (2oo5); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2oo4); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
484 (2000).
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show how the apparent innocence rule exposes some morally blameless
defendants to criminal conviction.
In Part II, I use several examples of federal general intent statutes to
show how the Court's current approach allows the conviction of criminal
defendants who did not know they were doing wrong. As I will show, not
even jury nullification potentially protects against the conviction of an
innocent-minded defendant, because a trial court will ordinarily apply
the rules of evidence to foreclose, for lack of relevancy, a jury from
hearing evidence of the defendant's innocent state of mind.
Finally, in Part III, I develop my argument that a true rule of
mandatory culpability would commit to the trial jury-rather than to
judges-the decision whether a defendant knew she was doing the type
of wrong targeted by the charged statute. I show that the jury is best
positioned to account for unique facts of each case and to engage in a
normative evaluation of a defendant's knowledge of wrongfulness. I
explain how such an approach could be implemented yet satisfy potential
objections about allowing a mistake-of-law defense or encouraging jury
nullification. I suggest, in short, that a court should let the jury decide if a
defendant knew she was doing wrong.
I.

AN ILLUSTRATION AND BACKGROUND OF THE
APPARENT INNOCENCE RULE

Consider the following example. Sam is driving one day when the
police pull him over and find in the trunk of his sedan a cardboard box
labeled "fireworks." Inside the box, however, the police find a powerful
homemade bomb. Sam is indicted under the National Firearms Act, a
federal law that prescribes up to ten years of prison for any person who
"receive[s] or possess[es] a firearm which is not registered to him in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record."' 9
Sam eventually gets a copy of the law and he sees that it defines the
term "firearm" in specialized detail to include, among other objects, the
type of explosive device found in his car, as well as other highly
dangerous items like machine guns, grenades, and short-barreled
shotguns. ° But beyond an intricate definition for a "firearm," the statute
stands oddly silent about what the prosecution must prove that Sam
knew:
(a)
Must Sam have known that there was anything at all in the
trunk of his car?

19. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5 86I(d), 5871 (2000).

See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)-(f) (2000) (defining "firearm" to include eight broad categories of
dangerous weapons, principally including machine guns, shotguns with barrels less than eighteen
inches in length, rifles with barrels less than sixteen inches in length, silencers, and destructive devices
such as bombs, grenades, and other explosive devices).
20.
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(b)

That he had a bomb (and not just scrap metal or holiday
fireworks)?
(c) That he had a bomb and that it was not registered?
(d) That he had a bomb and that it was not registered specifically
on the National Firearms Transfer Registration Record (as
opposed to some other state or local registry)?
(e) That he knew all the facts above and that the law prohibited
possession of a bomb that was not registered with the
National Firearms Transfer Registration Record?
For all these issues of what Sam must know, the statute does not say or
explain.
Sam's problem is far from unusual. As William Stuntz has observed,
the National Firearms Act is not "some obscure backwater of the federal
criminal code" but "remains one of the staples of federal gun
prosecutions." 2' Indeed, beyond firearms offenses, the federal criminal
code is replete with regulatory or general intent offenses of the kind
charged against Sam." This includes not only firearms offenses but also
drug trafficking and immigration offenses-these three offense
categories collectively account for more than 70% of the crimes charged
in the federal courts, and the proportion is increasing over time. 3
21. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2568 (2004).
22. As distinct from a "specific intent" crime, a "general intent" crime prohibits certain conduct
but without explicitly requiring that the defendant have intended or desired by her conduct to break
the law or to do wrong (such as to defraud). See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 230

(1989) (defining "general intent" offense to include situations

where "it is sufficient to convict when the defendant did what in ordinary speech we would call simply
an intentional action," without proof that the defendant intended further consequences from his
action). Of course, in light of the more refined mental state definitions set forth in the Model Penal
Code, the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" have fallen into some disfavor. See United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (198o). However, the terms have not fallen into disuse. See, e.g.,
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268-69 (2ooo). The term "regulatory" offense also defies precise
definition but ordinarily refers to "a broad collection of statutes dealing with matters within the
purview of federal, state, and local administrative agencies, such as the environment, product and
workplace safety, labor and employment, transportation, trade, the issuance of securities, the
collection of taxes, housing, and traffic and parking." Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag
Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L. J.
1533, 1544 (1997); accord Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice:
Confronting 'Apparent Innocence' in the Law, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REV. I, 32 (1995) ("Estimates suggest
that over three hundred thousand federal regulations are punishable by criminal penalties enforceable
through the combined efforts of as many as two hundred different federal agencies.").
23. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS I tbl.t (2003)
[hereinafter JUSTICE STATISTICS] (showing upward historical trends from 1994 for drug, weapons, and
immigration arrests, while showing relatively flat level of property and violent crime cases). available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslpub/pdf/fcjto3.pdf. The most commonly charged statutes in each of
these categories are "general intent" offenses, as I define that term. See id. at 8-IO figs.9. I I & 13; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (20oo) (illegal reentry into the United States by a previously deported alien): 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (2000) (illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000)
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For the criminally accused, what the government must prove means

far more than our academic exercise here. Imprisonment-rather than
probation-is imposed in about ninety percent of firearms, drug, and

immigration cases. 4
In contrast to federal specific intent crimes (i.e., criminal statutes

that contain a textual requirement of a defendant's intent to do wrong or
knowledge of the wrongful nature of her acts),25 federal general intent
statutes frequently fail to say what a criminal defendant must have
known in order to be convicted and jailed. Some of these statutes-like
the National Firearms Act-stand altogether silent about whether a
person must act "knowingly" or with any other particular mental state
(e.g., intentionally, willfully, recklessly, etc.).
Other general intent
statutes deploy the term "knowingly" but do not say what particular
aspects of the offense a defendant must know.27 Resorting to what Dan

(drug dealing);

UNITED

STATES

SENTENCING

COMMISSION,

SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL

SENTENCING

STATISTICS fig.A (2005) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION] (indicating that for fiscal year 2005, drug
cases (34.2%), immigration cases (25.0%), and firearms cases (12.2%) total 71.4%), available at

http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/Fig-a.pdf.
24- See JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 20 tbl.1
5 (2003).
25. A specific intent requirement "demands that the government prove that a defendant had
general knowledge of the law which forbade his actions and acted with the specific intent to
circumvent that law. But the government need not prove the defendant had knowledge of the specific
regulation governing the conduct engaged in-in other words, a defendant cannot avoid prosecution
by claiming that [he or she] had not brushed up on the law." United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 147
(3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted); accord Samuel W. Buell. Novel Criminal
Fraud, 81 NYU L. REV. 1971, 2032 (2006) ("Criminal fraud laws, like most other important whitecollar prohibitions, require a showing of 'specific intent' (a purpose to defraud, to obstruct justice, to
falsify government reports, etc.)."). Examples of such common federal "specific intent" offenses -ones
that expressly require in their text a defendant's knowledge, purpose, or intent to do wrong-include
mail, wire, and bank fraud, i8 U.S.C. § 134L. 1343, 1344 (2000), robbery and larceny, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a)-(b) (2000), money laundering, t8 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000), and obstruction of justice. See, e.g.,
Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696. 696 (2005) (interpreting "knowingly . ..
corruptly" requirement of federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)). To the extent that
a general intent crime may be charged as a conspiracy, attempt, or aiding-and-abetting offense, a
defendant's purpose or knowledge to do wrong is also required. See, e.g., Braxton v. United States, 500
U.S. 344. 350-51 (i99i) (noting that a charge of attempt to kill a federal officer under i8U.S.C. § 1114
requires proof of defendant's intent to kill the officer); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 691 (1975)
(noting prevailing rule that "a conspiracy, to be criminal, must be animated by a corrupt motive or a
motive to do wrong"); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (949) (finding that aiding and
abetting liability established where defendant "consciously shares in any criminal act").
26. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000) (unlawful reentry by alien) 18 U.S.C § 1955 (2000)
(conducting an illegal gambling business); 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2000) (possession of certain types of
firearms without a permit).
27. See, e.g.. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (2000) (unlawful gun possession by a previously convicted
felon); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(I) (2000) (mailing, transporting, or shipping child pornography): 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000) (drug dealing). One notable exception is a recent amendment by Congress to
an anti-terrorism statute that specifies the type of knowledge a defendant must be proved to have had.
See I8U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(t) (2000) (prohibiting "knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources
to a foreign terrorist organization" and further specifying that "[t]o violate this paragraph, a person
must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . .that the
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Kahan deems a "virtue of vagueness," Congress has through this
imprecision left it to the courts to decide the requirements of mens rea. s
In response, the Supreme Court has declined to presume absolute
strict liability-that the prosecutor may secure a conviction without any
proof of a defendant's mental state. Instead, the Court has concluded
that a trial court's instructions must require the jury to determine that
the defendant acted knowingly in some manner. 9 "[T]he requirement of
some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded, [and] far more than the
simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is
necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement. 30 What does
this mean for Sam? At a minimum, he does not get convicted simply
because there was a bomb that he did not know about in the trunk of his
car.
Although the Court stands willing to imply some form of mental
state requirement even if the text of a statute has none, the Court also
abides by the venerable principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.'
Correlatively, the Court has long since abandoned a vision of the jury as
"law giver" and subordinated the jury to the legal interpretations of
judges.3" Therefore, absent explicit statutory language connoting a higher
mental state requirement (for example, a "willfulness" requirement, as
discussed below), the Court declines to construe a criminal statute to
require that a defendant be shown to have known of the law that she is
charged with violating.33 Sam can be convicted even if he had never read
or heard of the federal firearms statute charged against him.
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . or that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorism"). Congress added the specific knowledge description to § 2339B only after a
court challenge to the law and in light of the government's litigating position that a donor could be
convicted for materially supporting a terrorist organization even if the donor did not know of the
organization's terrorist activities. See I8 U.S.C. § 2339B, as amended by Pub. L. 108-458, § 6603(c)
(2000); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 399-403 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated on other grounds, 382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
28. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 345, 369
(1994) [hereinafter Kahan, Lenity]; see also Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But
Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 153 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Ignorance of the Law]
(noting that despite the maxim "that legislatures alone are responsible for defining crimes ... criminal
statutes typically emerge from the legislature only half-formed and must be completed through
contentious, norm-laden modes of interpretation that are functionally indistinguishable from
common-law making").
29. See Staples v. United States, 5i U.S. 6oo, 605 (1994).
30. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
31. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998) (noting the "traditional rule that ignorance of
the law is no excuse"); see also Kahan, Ignorance of the Law, supra note 28 (discussing "classic"
Holmesian view for disallowance of "mistake of law" doctrine and proposing alternative "antiHolmesian" view).
32. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wisc. L.
REV. 377, 434-35 (i99); William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 71
TENN.

L.

REV.217, 220 (2004).

33. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 2oo-oi (199i) (requiring violation of "known
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In short, the prosecution in a general intent case must prove a
defendant had at least some knowledge of what she was doing. But the
prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant knew she was
breaking a specific law.
Beyond these threshold precepts, the rules are otherwise murky
about just what the prosecution must prove a defendant knew. One
might think that even if a defendant need not know of the law she was
violating, she should at least be proved to know each of the element facts
that qualify her conduct for conviction. After all, if the existence of a
particular fact is important enough to be included by Congress as a
factual element of conviction, why shouldn't the government have to
prove that the defendant knew that this fact existed? Under such a knowevery-fact approach, Sam would have to be proved to have known: (a)
that there was a bomb in his car, (b) that he possessed it, and (c) that the
bomb was not registered in the National Firearms Transfer Registration
Record.
Despite some overbroad dicta in recent cases,34 the know-every-fact
approach has not carried the day. The courts routinely uphold criminal
convictions for federal general intent crimes on the basis of partial strict
liability-that is, on the basis of a defendant's knowledge of some, but
not all, of the element facts underlying her offense."
An early vehicle for strict liability was the public welfare offense
doctrine. The doctrine holds that public safety concerns spawned by an
increasingly interdependent, industrial society warrant imposing liability
on a defendant even if she does not know all the facts surrounding her
conduct. 6 Under this view, a defendant who engages in activities for
legal duty" for "willfulness"); United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
34- See Dixon v. United States, i26 S. Ct. 2437, 2441 (2006) ("'Unless the text of the statute
dictates a different result, the term "knowingly" merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense."' (quoting Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193) (emphasis added)); Staples, 511 U.S. at 605
(referring in passing to "a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant
know the facts that make his conduct illegal") (emphasis added). As shown below, despite these
statements, the Supreme Court has not actually required a defendant to have knowledge of every fact
that renders her conduct illegal.
35. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 31
(Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (noting that a "strict liability" crime is one "where it is not defence to show
that the accused, in spite of the exercise of proper care, was ignorant of the facts that made his act
illegal"); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1075, 1079 (997) ("Strict criminal liability is conventionally understood as criminal liability that does
not require the defendant to possess a culpable state of mind."); Wiley, supra note 12, at 1031-33
(noting "one common meaning" of strict liability "that refers to a crime that has at least one element
as to which no mental state is required" and a "second meaning of 'strict liability' [that] describes
criminal liability that arises upon proof that a defendant has done a forbidden act, without any proof
about that defendant's mental state," but adopting third definition of "strict liability" to mean
"liability without proof of culpability, not liability without proof of mental state").
36. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253-56 (952) (describing advent of crimes without
"any ingredient of intent" in light of the "industrial revolution," the "[clongestion of cities," the
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which she is on notice that she stands in a "responsible relation to a
public danger" need .not be proved to have known all the details of
conduct that has jeopardized the welfare of others. To the extent that this
would allow for the conviction of a defendant who did not know she was
doing so, the public welfare doctrine trusts prosecutors not to pursue
undeserving defendants.37
The public welfare doctrine began in 1922 when the Court construed
a felony drug dealing statute in United States v. Balint not to require a
defendant to know he was dealing with illegal drugs.18 It gained
momentum in 1943 in United States v. Dotterweich when the Court
allowed a company president to be convicted for his company's shipment
of mislabeled adulterated drugs even though the president did not know
the drugs to be mislabeled or adulterated. 9 Several years later, the
doctrine faltered in 1952 when the Court declined in Morissette v. United
States to apply it to common law crimes.4' The doctrine rose again in 1971
in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., involving
another regulatory offense applied to a defendant charged with shipping
acid through the mail.4'
For Sam's case, the public welfare doctrine would mean that so long
as he knew that he had something dangerous in his car, he was on notice
that he stood in a responsible relation to a public danger. He need not
have known more specifically that he had a powerful bomb-rather than
fireworks-much less need he have known that the bomb was not in fact
registered.
More recently, the Supreme Court has increasingly applied the
apparent innocence rule in place of the public welfare offense doctrine.
In contrast to the public welfare doctrine's emphasis on the potential
harm to society, the apparent innocence doctrine laudably focuses on
avoiding the conviction of a defendant for conduct she would not be
expected to know is wrong. The rule was foreshadowed as early as 1952
in Morissette when the Court declined to apply the public welfare
doctrine to a defendant charged with conversion of government property

"[lt]raffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of [that] came to subject the wayfarer to
intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to observe new cares and uniformities of
conduct," and the "[w]ide distribution of goods [that] became an instrument of wide distribution of
harm"). See generally Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
37. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277. 284-85 (1943) (noting that "[h]ardship there
doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of
wrongdoing be totally wanting," and '[o]ur system of criminal justice necessarily depends on
'conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers"' (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
378 (1913))).
38. 258 U.S.
39. 320 U.S.
40. 342 U.S.
41. 402 U.S.

250, 254 (1922).

at 281.
at 262.

558, 559, 563 (i97I).
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after he took spent bomb casings from government land in circumstances
suggesting that he believed his trespass not to be wrongful and the scrap
metal to be abandoned.4 Justice Jackson's opinion in Morissette famously
observed that "[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.""
In 1971, the Court considered in United States v. Freed the case of a
defendant charged with illegal possession of a hand grenade.' The
defendant was charged under the National Firearms Act-the same
statute as charged against Sam-and he contended that the government
must prove he knew that the hand grenades were not registered.45 The
Court ruled that "[t]he Act requires no specific intent or knowledge that
the hand grenades were unregistered. ' ' , 6 Focusing on the individual's
expectation about the legitimacy of his conduct, the Court reasoned that
"[t]his is a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which
may well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised
47
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act."
The Court applied the apparent innocence rule again in 1985 in
Liparota v. United States when it considered what a defendant must have
known in order to be prosecuted for violating the federal food stamp law.
The statute prescribed criminal penalties for "whoever knowingly uses,
transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses [food stamp] coupons or
authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations."' 44 Frank Liparota, who ran a sandwich shop in Chicago, was
convicted after he met with an undercover agent in the backroom of his
shop and paid cash to the agent for food stamps at well below the facevalue amount of the food stamps.49 The trial court instructed the jury in a
manner that permitted Liparota to be convicted merely on the basis of
proof that he knew the nature of his actions (buying food stamps for
cash) and without any awareness that what he did was illegal.5"
The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the statute "requires
a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by
statute or regulations," citing the "background assumption of our
criminal law" that "criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a
'generally disfavored status.'" '5' The Court reasoned that "to interpret the
statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently
See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248-49.
43. Id. at 250.
44. 401 U.S. 6ol (1971).
45. See id.
42.

46. Id. at 607.
47. Id. at 6o8.
48. Liparota v. United States. 471 U.S. 419 ,420 (985).
49. Id. at 42 .
50. Id. at 422-23.
5i. Id. at 425-26 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (I978)).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

innocent

[Vol. 59:137

conduct."52 It imagined various scenarios of "innocent"

breaches of the food stamp regulations: a hypothetical defendant who
was not qualified to receive food stamps but nonetheless "possessed"
them without authorization solely because they were mistakenly mailed
to him due to an administrative error, or a defendant who unlawfully
"altered" the mistakenly sent food stamps by tearing them up, or a
defendant who unlawfully "transferred" the food stamps by simply
throwing them away.53 In response to the government's reliance on the
public welfare doctrine, the Court ruled that the misuse of food stamps
did not pose the kind of public safety threat as the shipment of
adulterated drugs in Dotterweich 4
In 1994, the Court applied the apparent innocence rule again in
Staples v. United States, in which the defendant Harold Staples was
charged under the National Firearms Act with unlawful possession of an
unregistered automatic firearm (a machine gun). 5 Staples conceded that
he had a prohibited firearm but contended that he thought it was merely
a legal semi-automatic weapon and not a fully automatic machine gun
that was subject to the Act.5 By a five to four decision, the Court agreed
with Staples. 7 In the Court's view, the statute could improperly extend to
"any person who has purchased what he believes to be a semiautomatic
rifle or handgun, or who simply has inherited a gun from a relative and
left it untouched in an attic or basement .... despite absolute ignorance
8
of the gun's firing capabilities, if the gun turns out to be an automatic.,,
The Court distinguished Freed (the hand grenade case) on the
ground that it involved knowledge of a different factual element (the
statute's registration requirement, not its definition of the factual
characteristics of a regulated firearm): "[D]ifferent elements of the same
offense can require different mental states."59 The Court also reasoned
that guns were different from hand grenades-that not "all guns [can] be
compared to hand grenades," because "the fact remains that there is a
long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals
in this country."" Thus, "[i]n glossing over the distinction between
grenades and guns, the Government ignores the particular care we have
taken to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where
doing so would 'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent

52.
53.
54
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 426.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 433.
511 U.S. 600, 602-03 (1994).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 6oI-02.
Id. at 615.

59. Id. at 609.
60. Id. at 61o.
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The Staples majority also rebuffed the government's invitation to
apply the public welfare doctrine to the regulation of firearms: "Even
dangerous items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally
available that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the
likelihood of strict regulation.""26 Accordingly, in the absence of a "clear
statement" from Congress dispensing with a mens rea requirement, "we
should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any
statute defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea."6 , It
emphasized that "our holding depends critically on our view that if
Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly
ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, and to subject
them to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more clearly to that
effect." 64
Several months after Staples, the Court considered United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc.,6 5 involving a statute that prohibited any person
from "knowingly" transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or
reproducing a "visual depiction," if such depiction "involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 66 The Court conceded at
the outset that the "most natural grammatical reading" of this statute was
that "the term 'knowingly' modifies only the surrounding verbs"
(transport, distribution, etc.), and "the word 'knowingly' would not
modify the elements of the minority of the performers, or the sexually
explicit nature of the material, because they are set forth in independent
clauses separated by interruptive punctuation."6 But it rejected this
reading of the statute:
If we were to conclude that "knowingly" only modifies the relevant
verbs in § 2252, we would sweep within the ambit of the statute actors
who had no idea that they were even dealing with sexually explicit
material. For instance, a retail druggist who returns an uninspected roll
of developed film to a customer "knowingly distributes" a visual
depiction and would be criminally liable if it were later discovered that
the visual depiction contained images of children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Or, a new resident of an apartment might receive mail
for the prior resident and store the mail unopened. If the prior tenant
had requested delivery of materials covered by [the statute], his
residential successor could be prosecuted for "knowing receipt" of
such materials. Similarly, a Federal Express courier who delivers a box
in which the shipper has declared the contents to be "film" "knowingly
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (985)).
Id. at 611.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
513 U.S. 64 (1994).
66. Id. at 67-68 (quoting I8 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

67. Id. at 68.
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transports" such film. We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws,
intended such results. 6'
The Court noted that "Morissette, reinforced by Staples, instructs
that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to
each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct." ' 9 However, this does not require a defendant's knowledge of
all the element facts of an offense: "The presumption in favor of scienter
requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent
conduct." 7
Yet again in 1994, the Court expanded its application of the
apparent innocence rule, this time in the context of a statute that
penalized "willful"-as opposed to "knowing"-misconduct. In Ratzlaf
v. United States, the Court considered a statute that prohibited anyone
from "willfully" engaging in the "structuring" of bank deposits to evade
the federal reporting requirements imposed on banks for large cash
transactions (i.e., staging transactions in amounts slightly less than the
reportable amount of $io,ooo). 7 ' Waldemar Ratzlaf was a gambler who
showed up one day at a Nevada casino with $160,000 of cash gambling
proceeds in a shopping bag.72 He wanted to give the cash to the casino in
order to pay off his prior gambling debt from a bad night of blackjack,
and he told the casino that "he did not want any written report of his
payment to be made."73 The casino vice-president, however, told Ratzlaf
that the casino could not accept a cash payment of more than $o,ooo
without filing a currency transaction report.74 Ratzlaf, his wife, and a
casino employee responded by going to several area banks in Nevada
and California, where they used the cash to buy cashier's checks in the
amount of $9,500-just under the legal reporting limit.75 At some of the
banks, the Ratzlafs bought two $9,500 checks-one for each of thembut then cancelled the transactions when they were told that the dual
purchase would trigger the bank's filing a currency report. 76 Ratzlaf
returned to the casino later the same day and paid off $76,000 of the
debt.77 In the ensuing weeks, Ratzlaf recruited three more people to use
cash to buy cashier's checks under the reporting limit, and he himself

68. Id. at 69.
69. Id. at 72.
70. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting X-Ciiement Video, 513 U.S. at 72).
71. 510 U.S. 135, 140 (0994)(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
72. Id. at 15o (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. Id.; see also United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d i28o, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. Ratzlaf,51o U.S. at 150 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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bought five more cashier checks within one week. 78
At trial, Ratzlaf admitted "that he structured cash transactions, and
that he did so with knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid, the banks' duty
to report currency transactions in excess of $IO,O00. 79 But Ratzlaf
insisted that the "willfulness" requirement of the statute required not just
that he know of the reporting requirement but that he know that his
structuring activity-the staging of deposits just under $io,ooo in order to
avoid triggering the reporting
He relied
1
81 requirement-was itself illegal.'
on Cheek v. United States, a recent decision of the Court that had
construed a "willful" requirement in a criminal tax evasion statute to
require proof that a defendant knew the provision of tax law with which
he was charged with violating.s

By a five to four margin, the Supreme Court agreed with Ratzlaf,
concluding that the "willfulness" requirement evinced Congress' intent
to require knowledge that structuring itself was unlawful, even despite
some "contrary indications in the statute's legislative history."" 3 The
Court acknowledged that there were "bad men" who engage in
structuring activity to conceal illegally-earned money from detection by
the government, but it declined to accept that structuring activity is
"inevitably nefarious."" 4 It posited hypothetical circumstances in which a
legitimate businessman might well decide to structure transactions for
lawful purposes, such as to "reduce the risk of an IRS audit," to decrease
"the likelihood of burglary, or in an endeavor to keep a former spouse
unaware of his wealth." Thus, the Court concluded that "we are
unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously 'evil' or
inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective
of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring."8'6
In dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that historically no distinction
had been recognized between a requirement of "willful" and "knowing"
conduct; the Model Penal Code construed "willful" to require only
consciousness of the act, not consciousness that the act was unlawful.
"[T]he conduct at issue-splitting up transactions involving tens of
thousands of dollars in cash for the specific purpose of circumventing a
78.
79.
8o.
81.

Id.
Id. at 140 (majority opinion).
Id. at138.
See id. at 142, 148; see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
82. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-03.
83. Ratzlaf. 510 U.S. at 146-47 n.17; see also id. at 158-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reviewing
legislative history).
84. Id. at 144 (majority opinion).
85. Id. at 144, 145 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 146.
87. Id. at I51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun urged that Cheek be limited to the complex
context of the internal revenue code. Id. at 157.
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bank's reporting duty-is hardly the sort of innocuous activity" at issue
in the Liparota food stamp fraud case. Ratzlaff "was anything but
uncomprehending as he traveled from bank to bank converting his bag of
cash to cashier's checks in $9,500 bundles," and "as a result of today's
decision, Waldemar Ratzlaf-to use an old phrase-will be 'laughing all
the way to the bank." 's
Four years later, in Bryan v. United States,90the Court returned again
to the meaning of "willful"-this time in the context of a firearms law
penalizing one who "willfully" violates a separate law forbidding dealing
in firearms without a federal license. 9' Sillasse Bryan used various "straw
purchasers" to buy firearms in Ohio under false pretenses.92 After
assuring the straw purchasers that he would render the firearms
untraceable by filing off their serial numbers, Bryan resold the firearms
on street corners in New York City that were known as locations for
drug dealing activities.93
Although "[t]he evidence was unquestionably adequate to prove
that [Bryan] was dealing in firearms, and that he knew that his conduct
was unlawful," there was "no evidence that he was aware of the federal
law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. '
Accordingly, if the Court construed "willful" as it had in Cheek and
Ratzlaf to require knowledge of the law charged against him, Bryan's
conviction would have to be reversed. The Court, however, decided that
"[t]he word 'willfully' is sometimes said to be 'a word of many meanings'
whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it
appears."'95 This was a prelude to the Court's dilution of the willfulness
standard to require only that "[t]he jury must find that the defendant
acted with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful." The Court did not further
require-as in Cheek and Ratzlaf-knowledge of the law that was alleged
to be violated, and the Court distinguished Cheek and Ratzlaf on the
ground that they "involved highly technical statutes that presented the
danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent

88. Id. at 155.
89. Id. at 162. Congress was not amused by the Court's Ratzlafdecision and promptly amended
the statute to make clear that a structurer need not know his conduct to be illegal. See Money
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 41i(a), (c)(i), to8 Stat. 216o, 2253
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a)-(b), 5324(c) (I994)).
90. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
91. Id. at 188-89.
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 191 (citing Spies v. United States 317 U.S. 492, 497 (I943)).
96. Id. at 193.
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conduct."' According to the Court, "the willfulness requirement of [the
statute] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful
is all that is required."
In dissent, Justice Scalia accepted the notion that the government
need not have proven that Bryan "knew the law" in the sense that he
could cite "chapter and verse from Title I8 of the United States Code.""
But he maintained that the defendant must be "generally aware that the
actus reus punished by the statute-dealing in firearms without a
license-is illegal."'" He faulted the majority for being "willing to accept
a mens rea so 'general' that it is entirely divorced from the actus reus this
statute was enacted to punish .... Thus, Bryan was guilty of willfully
dealing federal firearms without a license based on the jury's conclusion
that, even though "he had never heard of the licensing requirement," he
knew "he had violated the law by using straw purchasers or filing the
serial numbers off the pistols," which was conduct that was separately
proscribed by other firearms laws."2 Under the same reasoning, Bryan
could be convicted if he knew any other conduct associated with his
firearms dealing was illegal-for example, "that his street-corner
transactions violated New York City's business licensing or sales tax
ordinances," or "that the car out of which he sold the guns was illegally
double-parked, or if, in order to meet the appointed time for the sale, he
intentionally violated Pennsylvania's speed limit on the drive back from
the gun purchase in Ohio."'" According to Justice Scalia, "[o]nce we stop
focusing on the conduct the defendant is actually charged with (i.e.,
selling guns without a license), I see no principled way to determine what
law the defendant must be conscious of violating."' 4 He concluded that
the term "willfully" was ultimately ambiguous, such that the rule of lenity
warranted requiring proof that Bryan knew he was required to obtain a
firearms license for his street-corner dealings. 5
How does Sam fare under this line of "apparent innocence"
precedents? As an initial matter, the statute charged against him does
not contain a "willful" requirement. Therefore, the government will not
have to prove he knew the law (Ratzlaf) or even that he knew he was
doing something wrong (Bryan). Nor will the government have to prove

97. Id. at 194.

98. Id. at 196.
99. Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
too. Id.
tio.

Id.

102.

Id.

103. Id.

IO4. Id.at 202-03.
1o5. Id. at 205.
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he knew of the registration requirement (Freed), but Sam must be
proved to have known the factual characteristics of the contraption in his
trunk that qualify it as a bomb, as opposed to other items (such as
fireworks) that are not subject to the criminal prohibition of the National
Firearms Act (Staples).'06
Why shouldn't the government have to prove that Sam knew the
bomb was not registered? The government's rationale would be that
carrying around bombs is not itself "otherwise innocent" activity-the
would-be terrorist or malicious malcontent does not go free just because
he was strategically ignorant of-or indifferent to-the bomb's
registration status.
This reasoning may doubtlessly hold true for many cases. Yet
suppose that Sam is a highway construction foreman, and he believes
that the bomb is indeed registered in connection with its intended use for
a demolition project? Suppose his boss falsely assured him of that very
fact earlier in the morning-perhaps even gave him a bogus permit
certificate? Under the apparent innocence rule, Sam's belief does not
matter. He need not be shown to have had any knowledge at all about
the registration status of the bomb. His belief that it was registered is
irrelevant and not a defense. Sam will be convicted merely upon proof
that he knew it was a bomb that was in the car and that the bomb was not
federally
registered (regardless of what Sam knew about its registration
17
status). 0
Sam's case underscores the methodological fault of the apparent
innocence rule. The rule tasks judges with deciding as a matter of law
what conduct is "innocent" and what is not-hence, what facts as a class
connote "wrongful" conduct. From this judges designate which fact
elements must be proved to have been known by the defendant. Because
this process unfolds as an exercise in statutory interpretation, the facts
that a defendant must be proved to have known become set and
established as a matter of law applicable to all future cases involving the
same statute. The jury, in turn, decides solely the facts that the courts
have decreed of significance to assessing a defendant's personal
culpability. Unless Congress happens to have imposed a willfulness
Io6. See Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1998) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he mens rea
element of a violation of § 5861(d) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew that
the item he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a
firearm. It is not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that his possession was
unlawful, or that the firearm was unregistered." (footnote omitted)).
107. The same would hold true under the Model Penal Code, because the Code forecloses a
"mistake of fact" defense as to any fact for which a defendant is not otherwise required to have had a
culpable state of mind. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(0)(a) (t962); George Fletcher, Dogmas of the
Model Penal Code. 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 17 (1998) (noting that, under the Code "[i]f no state
mental [sic] is required for the particular element, then a mistake as to that element is irrelevant," and
this "eliminates the problem of mistake as an independent arena of moral and theoretical inquiry").
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requirement, the jury does not decide-with the benefit of all the facts at
trial-if a particular defendant who knew only element facts A and B
(but not facts C and D) acted with awareness that what she did was
wrong.
This confinement of juries to the determination of "just the facts" is
part of what Victoria Nourse has identified as the "denorming of mens
rea.''' As Nourse explains, "[o]nce upon a time, mens rea meant
culpability," but now under sterilely scientific notions of knowledge
advanced by the advent of the Model Penal Code, the concept of "mens
rea look[s] less like 'guilty mind' than simply 'mind.""' Congress has not
adopted the Model Penal Code as a template for a standardized code of
federal crimes, but the Supreme Court has liberally borrowed from the
Code's concept of "element analysis" with its methodological breakdown
of crimes into discrete elements and its focus on requiring an element-byelement evaluation of the mental state required for criminal conviction."'
Accordingly, as Ann Hopkins has noted, mens rea is often viewed "as a
strictly factual judgment rather than as a moral assessment," such that
"courts do not ask today's jurors to pass judgment on a defendant's
blameworthiness, but instead ask them only to resolve the factual issue of
what mental event took place in the accused's mind at the time she
performed the prohibited act ....

Many scholars fancifully exalt the power of a jury to "apply the law
to the facts" and even "to ignore the letter of the law when it believes
justice so requires .... But these dreamy descriptions of jury
Io8. See V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds: Understandingthe New Culpability,6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.

361, 365

(2002).

io9. Id.at 365-66 (2002); see also Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal
Law, io MICH. L. REV. 8I, 815 (noting how "culpability provisions of the [Model Penal] Code did
not merely simplify and consolidate traditional mens rea categories" but "also eschewed the kind of
frank normative assessments featured in traditional criminal fault concepts such as 'implied malice'
and 'depraved heart"').
iio. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 4o6 (i98o) (noting that "[cllear analysis requires that
the question of the kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced
separately with respect to each material element of the crime" (internal quotation marks ommitted));
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 at 229 (1985).
I I I. Hopkins, supra note 15, at 40 1.
112. E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 49-51 (2003) (noting that "[t]he Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects the jury's general verdict of acquittal, whether it is
because the jury disagrees that the facts establish legal guilt or because the jury believes that, although
the defendant is guilty under the letter of the law, she should not be deemed morally blameworthy
because of some higher principle of justice"); see also Lawrence M. Solan, Jurors as Statutory
Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (2003) ("Deciding whether a statute applies to a
given set of facts is what judges do when they interpret statutes, and it is part of the jury's job as
well."): cf. Brown. supra note 3, at 1204 (noting that juries "must interpret law in order to apply it, and
that interpretive process occurs in a broad context of considerations beyond the text's plain meaning
or the legislature's intent"); Nancy L. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 877,
882, 9o8-io (I999) (discussing jury's unreviewable power to nullify and arguing that juries have legal
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empowerment do not reflect the restrictive reality for juries in federal
courtrooms today (with which I am familiar from nearly ten years as a
federal criminal prosecutor). Juries are not simply handed a copy of a
criminal statute and told to interpret the law or decide how it should
apply it to the facts before them. Instead, federal trial courts issue
detailed instructions describing each factual element of the offense and
narrowing the jury's consideration to whether each factual element has
been proved. For example, in a felon-in-possession gun case, the statute
prohibits a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm "in or affecting
commerce.""..3 Juries do not mull the monetary metaphysics of the term
''commerce" or ponder the nuances of nexus suggested by a term as
broad as "in or affecting." They cannot even go to a dictionary to look up
these terms."4 Instead, they are told by the judge's instructions-which
are based on boilerplate instruction form books-that the element of "in
or affecting commerce" means proof that the gun at some point in time
traveled across a state line (a fact which the prosecution typically proves
from shipping records or from evidence that the gun was manufactured
in a different state or country than where it was found)."5 Juries
mechanically decide if this singular fact of the gun's crossing a state line
is true and they do so without interpreting or applying the law in any
manner.
Once a judge's instructions have issued, little remains of the law for
a jury to apply or interpret. If there is ambiguity in the instructions, juries
do not make up their own leal rules; instead, they send notes to the
judge requesting clarification.

gap-filling interpretive role akin to judges). In defense of the commentators, I should note that the
Supreme Court has also proclaimed the jury's historical role to be more than mere fact finding and to
apply the law to facts. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995) (noting that "[j]uries at
the time of the framing could not be forced to produce mere 'factual findings,' but were entitled to
deliver a general verdict pronouncing the defendant's guilt or innocence" and noting "the historical
and constitutionally guaranteed right of criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or
innocence on every issue, which includes application of the law to the facts"). But the Court has not
taken account of the instructional practice in the federal courts today as described above. So, for
example, in Gaudin, the Court held that the jury-not the judge-must determine the element of
"materiality" in a federal false statement case, yet without suggesting that juries may freely interpret
the meaning of "materiality"; in fact, standard jury instructions particularize the definition of
"material" to mean a statement that is naturally capable of influencing the decision of the relevant
decisionmaker. See, e.g., KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 40.03
(6th ed. 2006); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (defining materiality).
113. I8U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Aguirre, io8 F.3d 1284, 1288-9o (ioth Cir. 1997); United States v.
Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457,459 (6th Cir. 1995).
115. See United States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d i,9-io (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); United
States v. Shambry, 392 F.3 d 631, 634-35 n.I(3d Cir. 2004) (same); O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at
§ 39.14. The common instructional formbooks include O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, and LEONARD
SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Matthew Bender 2005).
16. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at § 20.07 (describing manner in which court should respond
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What of the jury's power to nullify? Juries doubtlessly have the right
and power as, Justice Holmes put it, "to bring in a verdict in the teeth of
both law and facts,"' I 7 and if nullification means acquittal for a criminal
defendant, this action is unreviewable by any court because of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. But juries are most assuredly never advised of
their nullification power."8 To the contrary, federal juries are told that it
is the judge who determines the law and that the judge's legal
instructions are controlling even if the jury disagrees with the law. They
are admonished that "[n]either shall you be concerned with the wisdom
of any rule of law stated by the Court," and they are warned in the most
sobering of terms that "[r]egardless of any opinion you may have as to
what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to
base any part of your verdict upon any other view or opinion of the law
than that given in these instructions.""..9 Not surprisingly, "the analysis of
jury behavior during deliberations in real trials show that jurors see
themselves as obligated to apply the law, and that they spend a
significant portion of their time during deliberations discussing the
law .....
If the trial court gets wind of a juror's intent to nullify, the juror is
subject to dismissal.'

Lest any doubt remains about the fact-decider limitations of the
jury's role, jurors are routinely reminded that "[y]ou were chosen as
jurors for this trial in order to evaluate all of the evidence received and to
decide each of the factual questions presented by the allegations brought
by the government in the indictment ....
At no time are federal juries
invited to find, apply, or interpret the law-much less alerted that they

to questions from jury during deliberations).
117. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1925).

I18. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A) trial court is not
required to inform a jury of its power to nullify .... [T]he power of juries to 'nullify' or exercise a
power of lenity is just that-a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should
encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Edwards, ioi F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases to the effect that "juries have the power to
ignore the law in their verdicts, [but] courts have no obligation to tell them they may do so"); United
States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3 d 1161, 119o (ist
Cir. 1993) ("[Wlhile jurors may choose to flex their
muscles, ignoring both law and evidence in a gadarene rush to acquit a criminal defendant, neither the
court nor counsel should encourage jurors to exercise this power.").
119. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at § 12.01 ("It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as
stated in all of the instructions of the Court and to apply these rules of law to the facts as you find
them to be from the evidence received during the trial."); accord NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 (2003): PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT I.OI
(1998) (instructing that "[y]our first duty is to decide the facts from the evidence
in this case," and "[y]our second duty is to apply the law that I give you to the facts," and "[y]ou must
follow these instructions, even if you disagree with them").
12o. Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of a Jury, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 717, 749 (2006).

121. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606,616 (2d Cir. 1997).
122. O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at § 12.01 (emphasis added).
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are free to disregard it. Federal juries are told just to find the facts-not
the law or their conscience-in federal courtrooms today.
It follows that unless a federal jury is told to decide if a defendant
knew she was doing something wrong, there is little reason to suppose
that the jury's ultimate verdict will incorporate any kind of a normative
evaluation of a defendant's moral blameworthiness. This is especially so
because, unless a general intent statute contains a "willfulness"
requirement, application of the apparent innocence rule will restrict the
evidence that the jury hears of a defendant's potentially innocent state of
mind. Once a court has decided what fact elements a defendant must be
proved to have known, the rest of what a defendant knew or believed
does not matter-the defendant's knowledge of other fact elements is
legally irrelevant and therefore subject to preclusion from evidence at
"' Evidence about the defendant's awareness or ignorance of
trial. 23
additional fact elements (such as Sam's belief that the explosive was
registered) will never come before the jury, and the jury will have no
reason or basis to exercise its power to nullify.
When courts as an exercise in statutory interpretation take it on
themselves to decide what conduct is "innocent," the inquiry soon
becomes academic in the absence of a tie to the facts of a particular case.
If "innocence" is judged simply by reference to the text of the charged
statute itself, then the inquiry sinks in circularity, as the very question is
what mental state suffices to make certain conduct a crime under the
statute that has been charged. On the other hand, if the "innocence" of
conduct is judged by reference to some other uncharged statute, then the
inquiry strays off course, as the defendant is held accountable for a
different or lesser crime or wrong than that which has been charged. If
"innocence" is to be judged by reference to no statute at all, then the
inquiry founders on abstract intuitions of what type of conduct society
believes to be wrong.
And this last inquiry raises an additional but central question:
whether judges-rather than juries-are the most competent and
legitimate arbiters of what conduct society deems wrongful. I will return
to this issue after reviewing in the next section of this Article the
numerous federal cases in which the apparent innocence rule has
continued to allow-indeed to invite-the conviction of morally
blameless defendants.

123. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. The concern is more than theoretical, as reflected by examples of
such successful motions in limine to preclude evidence of a defendant's innocent state of mind in Part
ILA below,
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II. MENs REA AND COMMON FEDERAL GENERAL INTENT CRIMES
The Supreme Court's approach to interpreting mens rea
requirements has played out in numerous lower court decisions involving
federal general intent crimes. This includes some of the most commonly
charged federal offenses such as immigration, firearms, and
environmental crimes. The Court's current approach often results in
relieving the prosecution from proving a defendant's knowledge of
element facts that bear on whether the defendant believed she was doing
anything wrong. Conversely, for some cases, the Court's current
approach requires excessive knowledge-that a defendant know the
details of particular factual elements that do not bear on the
wrongfulness of his conduct. This is another drawback of the
methodology of resolving culpability issues on a categorical, element-byelement basis, rather than considering the full range of a particular
defendant's conduct. Moreover, because the current doctrines focus only
on what facts a defendant knew (outside the "willful" line of cases), this
precludes the jury from receiving and evaluating highly guilt-probative
evidence of "non-facts," such as a defendant's confession that she knew
the law and intended to do wrong.
These themes play out in three very commonly-charged federal
offense categories: (i) immigration cases, (2) firearms cases, and (3)
environmental crimes cases. At the end of this section, I examine the
alternative approach taken by the Model Penal Code's "material
elements" analysis and show how it also proves similarly problematic
because of its restrictive element-by-element approach to resolution of
mens rea issues.
A.

IMMIGRATION CRIMES

Federal immigration cases now account for 25% of all federal
criminal cases. 24 The prosecution of these crimes has more than tripled in
the last ten years.

25

The most commonly charged immigration crime

prohibits an alien who has been previously removed or deported from
the United States from reentering the country. ' Defendants convicted
under the "illegal re-entry" statute receive an average prison term of
three years.

'

27

124. See SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 23.
125. See Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, Number of Defendants in Cases Filed,
http://fjsrc.urban.org/analysis/t-sec/title.cfm?stat= i &year=2005&t-ch=tsec&str-title=+8&title=+8
(check "All sections" box and choose display option) (showing 11,652 cases charged under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326, 1326(a), and 1326(b) in 2005 of 17.371 total immigration cases charged) (last visited Oct. 31,
2007); JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 8 fig.9 (showing increase in immigration cases from 5,526 in
1994 to 20,341 in 2003. with nearly 12.000 immigration cases in 2003 being illegal reentry
prosecutions).
126. See JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 8 fig.9.
127. See SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 23, at fig.E (including average sentence for post-
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The illegal reentry statute makes criminal a previously deported
alien's reentry into the United States "unless ...

the Attorney General

has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission. '28Like
many general intent crimes, the statutory text describes conduct only-it
does not contain any requirement that a defendant have acted
knowingly, intentionally, or with any particular state of mind. Must an
alien know each of the following element facts that are necessary to her
conviction:
(a) that she is an alien and not a citizen of the United States?
(b) that she was previously removed or deported?
(c) that she has reentered the United States? or
(d) that she did not have the consent of the Attorney General to
reenter the United States?
The federal courts have answered mostly "no" to these questions.
An alien may be convicted even if she believes she is not an alien,' even
if she believes that her prior departure from the country was not by
means of compulsory deportation,'30 even if she is not aware that she has
actually reentered the United States,'3 ' and even if she mistakenly
believes that the Attorney General has consented to her readmission.

Blakely immigration cases in FY2oo4 and pre-Booker cases in FY2005 of 22.9 months' imprisonment),
availableat http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo5/Fig-e-post.pdf.
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (2000).
i29. See United States v. Johnson, 87 F. App'x. 195, 196 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that
defendant "should have been allowed to present evidence that he believed in good faith that his past
military service in the United States armed forces qualified him for naturalization, and he
consequently did not know that he was not permitted to reenter the United States"); see also United
States v. Sotelo, IO9 F.3d I446, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant's belief that he was a
national and not an alien was not a defense to unlawful reentry charge). This Article cites unpublished
cases such as Johnson above, not because they are binding as precedent, but because they indicate how
the courts will treat particular claims; indeed, the fact that the courts have disposed of some claims by
unpublished opinion is indicative of the court's view that the issues decided are well-settled by
precedent and not worthy of formal publication. See, e.g., 2ND CIR. R. 0.23 (providing for use of
summary orders where "no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion"), available
at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules/LR.pdf.
130. United States v. Martinez-Morel, 118 F. 3 d 710, 713 (ioth Cir. 1997) (affirming preclusion of
defense that defendant believed his prior departure from country had been voluntary and not by
deportation, despite alien's proffer of a form he had received from the INS advising him of his right to
voluntary departure rather than deportation).
131. See United States v. Reyes-Medina, No. 94-1923, 1995 WL 247343, at *2 (ist Cir. Apr. 25,
1995) ("Although it is true that many people do not realize that Puerto Rico is a U.S. possession, the
sincerity or reasonableness of Reyes' beliefs are irrelevant."). But see United States v. SalazarGonzalez, 458 F.3d 851, 856 (9 th Cir. 2006) (noting that illegal reentry defendant must know he has
reentered the United States); United States v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253 F.3 d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Intent to reenter is an element-it is hardly likely that Congress would have made it a crime to be
transported involuntarily to the United States, say by an airplane hijacker ...
(internal citations
omitted)).
132. See Carlos-Colmenares,253 F.3 d at 277, 278 (collecting cases and concluding that "intent to
reenter the country without the Attorney General's express consent is not an element of section
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The courts have applied the apparently innocent rule to dispense
with these additional mental state requirements. For example, in United
States v. Martinez-Morel, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Staples and XCitement Video on the ground that "unlike the conduct proscribed in XCitement Video [child pornography] and Staples [machine gun
possession], crossing international borders is a type of conduct 'generally
subject to stringent public regulation." '33 Circularly assuming its
conclusion, the court added that "[e]ntering a country in violation of its
immigrations laws is not otherwise innocent conduct."' 34
Other courts have justified their strict liability approach by
suggesting that an alien should know to be careful about reentering
because the INS routinely warns departing aliens that their reentry
would be illegal.'35 Ironically, however, when the tables are turned, and
aliens attempt to show that they were misadvised by the INS about the
legality of reentering the country, the courts bar them from presenting
such evidence."36 The upshot is that the courts dispense with requiring
1326"); United States v. Hernandez-Cruz, No. 96-4338, 1997 WL 137991, at *i (4th Cir. Mar. 27, 1997)

(per curiam) (barring defendant from raising the defense that he believed that a government
document sent to him gave him permission to reenter the country); United States v. Asibor, lO9 F.3d
1023, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that despite fact that INS had approved defendant's request for
Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant Visa, no good faith defense
available); United States v. Soto, lo6 F.3d 1040, 1041 (Ist Cir. 1997) (noting that the fact that alien
obtained visa to reenter not a defense); United States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 68 (5th Cir.
1996) (noting that defendant was not entitled to jury instruction that American consulate's decision to
issue him nonimmigrant visa satisfied requirement that he obtain express consent of Attorney
General). Prior to Carlos-Colmenares, it had long been the rule in the Seventh Circuit that a
defendant's reasonable though mistaken belief that he had the consent of the Attorney General to
reenter the country was a defense to a prosecution under § 1326. See United States v. Anton, 683 F.2d
IOlI (7th Cir. 1982); see also Larry Kupers, Aliens Charged with Illegal Re-Entry Are Denied Due
Process and, Thereby, Equal Treatment Under the Law, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 861, 874-76 (2005)
(contending that Anton was correctly decided and aliens should have right to assert defense of belief
that entry was legal).
133. Martinez-Morel, It8 F.3d at 716 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 71(994).
134. Id. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. See United States v. Morales-Palacios, 369 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[Ulpon being
deported, an alien has been given both oral and written notice that he or she cannot reenter without
the express permission of the Attorney General."); United States v. Torres-Echevaria, 129 F.3d 692,
697-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting "the practice of the INS is to advise them that they face criminal liability
for an unlawful return" and that "deportation itself is sufficient to impress upon the mind of the
deportee that return is forbidden," so that "[t]he statute simply, and logically, makes the presumption
of unlawful intent conclusive").
136. See United States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d IIO6, IIO9 (9th Cir. 2002) (precluding
defense on basis of bad advice in INS form given to alien upon prior departure that suggested that the
alien could reenter the country without criminal consequence after five years); see also United States
v. Aquino-Chacon, IO9 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1997). The INS form also misadvised aliens that they
faced a penalty of only two years' imprisonment for reentry, when in fact they faced a penalty of up to
twenty years of imprisonment; nevertheless, the federal appeals courts have declined to authorize a
downward departure on this ground. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Ramirez, 309 F.3d 1255, 1261
(ioth Cir. 2002) (finding a downward departure improper where Congress did not contemplate this
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proof of a defendant's guilty knowledge, despite their own demonstrably
suspect assumption that aliens know they do not have permission to
return.
The practical effect of this precedent restricting the scope of what an
alien must be proved to have known is that the prosecution will
successfully preclude an alien from adducing evidence of an innocent
state of mind. 137 Consider the case of Jose Mancebo-Santiago, who sought
to introduce evidence at his illegal reentry trial that when he had been
previously deported he had not been warned that it was illegal to return
and that the INS did not take back his alien registration "green card."'"'
Several months after his deportation to the Dominican Republic, he flew
to Puerto Rico (United States territory), where he showed his
Dominican passport and his green card to the INS inspector, and he was
duly admitted into the United States.'39 The court barred this evidence,
declaring that "[t]he evidence appears to be calculated to unduly
prejudice the jurors by presenting them with evidence probative of the
defendant's good faith and mistaken belief which are legally
irrelevant.'. 4 Having been barred from adducing evidence of his
innocent state of mind, Mancebo-Santiago was convicted and sentenced
to one hundred months' imprisonment.'
The courts sometimes justify their analysis by stressing that a
criminal defendant need not know the law.'42 Yet this point overlooks the
relevant question: whether an alien knew of a baseline fact that must be
shown in order to secure the alien's conviction-that the Attorney
General had not granted permission to reenter. Knowledge of this
singular fact may starkly separate guilty-minded from innocent conduct.
In view of the minimal proof requirements for illegal reentry cases,
situation).
137. See, e.g., Morales-Palacios,369 F.3d at 449 (affirming district court's grant of motion in limine
"to exclude evidence of Morales's subjective belief that he had the consent of the Attorney General to
reenter the United States"); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez, 122 F.3d 15, 17-18 (8th Cir.
1997) (affirming district court's preclusion of defendant from testifying to his good faith belief that he
could reenter the United States and that he was permitted to do so when he presented his green card
at the border); United States v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming trial courts
preclusion of defendant's green card to show that he believed he had consent of Attorney General for
readmission).
138. United States v. Mancebo-Santiago, 875 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
139. See id.

i4o. Id. at 1036-37.
141. See United States v. Mancebo-Santiago, No. 96-1128, 1996 WL 560754, at *i (2nd Cir. Oct. 3,
1996)142. See United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55-56 (2d Cir. 199i) (per curiam); United
States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that mistaken belief as to the
legality of reentry is no defense because only general intent must be proven under § 1326); United
States v. Miranda-Enriquez, 842 F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (ioth Cir. 1988) (holding there is no defense of
mistaken belief of legality of reentry under § 1326 because the crime is a general intent crime and a
mistake instruction is appropriate only if criminal intent plays a part in the crime charged).
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little is left for a jury to decide. In 2005, the government's record at trial
in illegal reentry cases was seventy-three guilty verdicts and just six
acquittals or mistrials.' 3 Meanwhile, more than io,8oo defendants
charged with illegal reentry chose to plead guilty rather than venture
almost certain conviction at trial. '44
It has been long established that a crime of attempt is a specific
intent offense-the notion is that one cannot attempt to commit an
offense without an awareness that one is trying to commit an offense. But
this principle does not seem to hold true for illegal reentry cases. In cases
involving attempted illegal reentry (in which the alien was apprehended
before completing entry into the United States), a majority of federal
appeals courts to consider the issue have ruled that the government need
not prove the alien's knowledge that she did not have the consent of the
Attorney General to reenter the United States.'45
These courts have construed the attempt statute in this manner for
the same reasons used to justify their restrictive interpretation of the
substantive statute and have done so despite the absence of legislative
history directing a restrictive interpretation. Effectively appropriating the
jury's fact-finding role for themselves, the courts conclusively presume
that aliens who seek to reenter the country were previously given "both
oral and written notice that he or she cannot enter without the express
permission of the Attorney General," such that "[tihe act of attempting
to re-enter speaks for itself."'',

6

According to one recent decision, "[tlhere

is, therefore, no need, in order to protect truly innocent behaviorincluding good faith attempts to seek permission to reenter-to require
143.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS RESOURCE CENTER: OUTCOMES FOR

(FY2005), http://fjsrc.urban.org/analysis/t-sec/title.cfm?stat
IN CASES TERMINATED
=3&year=2oo5&t-ch=tsec&str title=+8&title=+8 (highlight title "o8-Aliens and Nationality";
highlight sections "8 1236," "8 1236A," "8 1326B"; and click desired display option) (last visited Oct.
DEFENDANTS

,

31 2007).
144- Id.
145. Compare United States v. Rodriguez, 416 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[Tlhe offense of
attempted illegal reentry under § 1326(a) does not require the government to allege or prove that a
defendant had the specific intent to reenter the United States without the expressed permission of the
Attorney General."), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1140 (2oo6), United States v. Morales-Palacios, 369 F.3d
442, 449 (5th Cir. 2004), United States v. Peralt-Reyes, 131 F.3d 956 (1ith Cir. 1997) (per curiam), and

United States v. Reyes-Medina. 53 F.3d 327 (Ist Cir. 1995) (per curiam), with United States v. SmithBaltiher, 424 F.3d 913. 923 26 (9th Cir. 2oo5) (holding that a defendant charged with attempted illegal
reentry may assert defense that he reasonably believed he was a United States citizen upon seeking to
reenter the country), and United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1I88, 1191-92 (9 th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) ("[T]he attempt prong of § 1326 incorporates the well-established common law meaning of
'attempt' and requires proof of a specific intent to enter illegally."). See generally Baruch Weiss, What
Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under FederalLaw,
7o FORDHAM L. REv. 1341, 1351-53 (2002) (describing "state of chaos" among federal courts whether
liability under aider-and-abettor statute requires specific intent or simple knowledge of underlying
statute).
146. Morales-Palacios,369 F.3d at 448.
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proof of knowledge of the need for permission from the Attorney
General or knowledge that no such permission had been granted.' 4 7 The
courts allow for no possibility that such warnings were not given or not
understood by the alien defendant.
In short, the illegal reentry cases suggest that "apparent innocence"
principles do not translate to a rule of mandatory culpability. In these
cases, the courts stand willing to assume-in the absence of support in
the text or legislative history-that Congress intended to dispense with
requiring the government to prove the alien's knowledge of most of the
element facts that are necessary to a conviction. The courts reach this
result by assuming certain facts to be conclusively true (such that the
alien was warned it would be illegal to reenter without consent of the
Attorney General) or by deciding that such acts as crossing the United
States border-which millions of persons legally do-are not "innocent"
innature.
A different criminal immigration statute illuminates a different
problem with the "apparent innocence" approach. Ancelmo Figueroa
was an immigration inspector who, by pre-arrangement with a coconspirator, let certain aliens go through his inspection station at JFK
airport without proper documentation."" One day Figueroa let an alien
named Garcia through his station.'49 Garcia could not legally enter the
United States, because he had previously been convicted of a kidnapping
offense, which is deemed an inadmissible "aggravated felony" under
immigration law.'5 ° There was plenty of evidence that inspector Figueroa
knew that Garcia could not legally enter the United States, but none to
suggest that Figueroa knew more precisely that it was Garcia's
"aggravated felony" status that disqualified him from re-entering the
United States.' 5'
The government charged Figueroa under an immigration statute
that prescribes up to ten years' imprisonment against any person who
"'knowingly aids or assists any alien excludable [as an aggravated
felon] ... to enter the United States." '52 Figueroa was not charged under
a cognate provision that prohibits assisting the entry of any illegal alien,
regardless of that alien's criminal history, and that prescribes a lesser
maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. '
Figueroa contended at his trial that he could not be convicted of the
more serious charged offense unless the government showed that he
147. Rodriguez, 416 F.3d at 128.

148. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3 d iii, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
149. Id. at 1 13.
150. Id.
15i. Id.
152. Id. at 112 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994)).
153. Id. at 118 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 13 2 4 (I)(A)(iv) (1994)).
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knew Garcia was an aggravated felon.'54 The Second Circuit, however,
ruled that Figueroa need only have known that Garcia was excludable;
Figueroa did not have to know that Garcia was an aggravated felon.' 5
The court reasoned that Figueroa's conduct was not otherwise
innocent. I,6 He knew that he was allowing the entry of an inadmissible
alien, and the statute did not require further wrongful knowledge.'57 In
reliance on X-Citement Video, the court concluded that "scienter
requirements should be presumed to stop once a defendant is put on
notice that he is committing a non-innocent act."' 5
Ancelmo Figueroa's case, and a line of other cases like it,'59 are
different from the immigration cases I have discussed above because
there is no question that Figueroa knew he was doing something wrong.
Yet Figueroa contended that he did not know the full scope of his
wrongdoing. The court's response that he need not have had further
knowledge suggests that the rule of "mandatory culpability" is, at best, a
rule of "mandatory partial culpability." The apparent innocence rule is
put to the service of a modified form of strict liability, which "occurs
when a defendant culpably engages in criminal conduct that causes
consequences other than those the defendant intended or contemplated,
and the defendant is held liable for the further consequences
automatically and without proof of the usual mens rea required for
conviction for the further consequences." 6°
Such enhanced liability may well be justified in the civil tort context,
because the purpose is to spread losses among the most culpable.' 6' By
contrast, in the criminal context, this enhanced liability operates like a
"punishment-enhancement lottery," randomly assessing a defendant for
consequences that he did not know or intend, while not doing so for
other defendants whose conduct was accompanied by the same wrongful
mental state but, by chance, not the same consequences.62
154. Id.at 118-i9.
155. Id. at i18; see also United States v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2ooo).
i56. See Figueroa, 165 F.3d at i18-I
9.
157. See id.

I58. Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 117 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71
(1994)).
159. See United States v. Cook, 76 F.3 d 596, 6oi ( 4 th Cir. 1996) (defendant convicted for use of
minor to engage in drug offense need not have known that he was using a minor "for the obvious
reason that receiving illegal drugs is not otherwise innocent conduct"); United States v. LaPorta, 46
F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1994) (convicting defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1361 for "willfully injur[ing]
or commit[ting] any depredation against any property of the United States" and finding defendant
need not have known property belonged to the United States because "arson is hardly 'otherwise
innocent conduct"').
i6o. Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and CriminalResponsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 363. 400
(2004).

161. Id. at 395.
162. Id. at 385, 404. Morse cites the example of "two drag-racing agents who drive into facing
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Of course, even if Figueroa did not actually know or intend to assist
the entry of a convicted kidnapper (as opposed to an alien with no
criminal history), it could be argued that Figueroa must have been aware
of some possibility or probability that Garcia would be a criminal. This
may be so. But the difficulty with the "otherwise innocent" approach is
that it irrebuttably presumes it to be so. What if Figueroa was assured by
his co-conspirator who arranged for Garcia to go through Figueroa's
inspection station that Garcia had no criminal history? What if Figueroa
obtained Garcia's criminal "rap sheet," which did not disclose a prior
conviction, before he allowed Garcia to pass through his station? Under
the apparent innocence rule, this evidence is categorically excluded at
trial because, as a matter of categorical statutory interpretation,
Figueroa's knowledge about Garcia's criminal history is not relevant.
B. GUN CRIMES
Another very commonly charged federal offense prohibits a
convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in
interstate commerce-more than five thousand defendants are charged
each year.'6 The felon-in-possession statute prohibits one who has been
"convicted . . . of any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year" from "possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition.' ' 6' A separate statute prescribes a prison term of
up to ten years' imprisonment for one who "knowingly violates" the

felon-in-possession prohibition.'6 ' The boilerplate elements of the federal
felon-in-possession offense are: (i) that the defendant knowingly
possessed a firearm; (2) that the defendant had been previously
traffic at an extraordinarily high speed" but who cause different harms: "In one case an approaching
driver is killed; in the second, death is narrowly averted by the unforeseeably great skill of the
approaching driver who avoids the crash by an exceptional maneuver. What justifiable difference in
culpability could there be?" Id. at 379-80.
163.

i8 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)

(2000); BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

RESOURCE CENTER, http://fjsrc.urban.org/analysis/t sec/stat.cfm?stat=i (last visited Oct. 31, 2007)
(select radio button "Number of defendants in cases filed"; highlight year "2005"; select radio button
"Select by title and section within U.S.C."; click "Select"; highlight title "i8-Crimes and Criminal
Procedure"; highlight section "i8 9 22G"; click desired display option) (offenses charged under Title t8
in 2005). Although there are a range of federal firearm criminal statutes, by far the most commonly
charged is the felon-in-possession statute, i8 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I). Id. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 5,513 defendants were charged in 2005 with felon-in-possession or other unlawful firearm
possession under § 922(g); this was 15% of all defendants (38,427) charged in 2005 with offenses under
the general federal criminal code (Title 18) and comprised more cases than charged with any other
single provision in the general federal criminal code. Id. According to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, for fiscal year 2005, more than 8,6oo defendants (about 12% of all federal criminal cases)
were charged with various federal firearms offenses. See SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 23, at
tbl. 3 , available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo5/table3.pdf. The mean incarceration term for a
federal weapons offense in fiscal year 2005 was 71.8 months. See id. at tbl.I3
(statistics from Oct. I,
2004 to Jan. II, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo5/tableI3_pre.pdf.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000).
165. Id. § 924(a)(2) (2000).
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convicted of a felony offense at the time of possession; and (3) that the
firearm previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., the

firearm previously crossed a state line).' 66

Juries in felon-in-possession cases are categorically instructed that a
defendant need only have knowledge of one of these three factual
elements. He need only have knowingly possessed a firearm, but he may
be convicted regardless of whether he knew that he was previously
convicted of a felony offense or that his firearm had previously crossed a

state line.'6 7
This imposition of partial strict liability will not raise a concern in
the majority of cases. Most defendants are well aware of their prior

felony history and, though they may be ignorant whether their firearm
ever crossed a state line, it is difficult to argue that knowledge of this
jurisdictional aspect bears on a defendant's belief that he was doing

something wrong. 6s
Nevertheless, the current approach still ensnares a range of
defendants who could not reasonably have believed they were doing
something wrong. For example, it allows the conviction of a defendant
who mistakenly believes that his prior "conviction" was never actually
entered, that it was subsequently expunged, or that the prior conviction
was merely a misdemeanor offense that did not disqualify him from
possessing a firearm.'6 It allows the conviction of a defendant who was
166. See, e.g., O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112, at § 39.09; see also United States v. Allen, 383 F.3d
644, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (Ioth Cir. 2004); United
States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2003).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539-40 ( 4 th Cir. 2006) (noting "a large body of
circuit precedent recognizing that a statutory mens rea requirement does not always apply to each
factual element of a criminal offense" and that "the United States must prove the defendant's
knowledge with respect to possession of the firearm but not with respect to other elements of the
offense"); United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the knowledge
requirement "only applies to the possession element" and rejecting defendant's argument, in reliance
on Staples and X-Citement Video, that defendant must be alleged and proved to have known of his
prior felony); United States v. Langley, 62 F. 3 d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("'[T]he defendant's
knowledge of the weapon's interstate nexus or of his felon status was irrelevant."' (quoting United
States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1988))) ,
168. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-69 (984) (holding that defendant need
not have known of federal agency jurisdiction in order to be convicted for making a false statement
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency and that "jurisdictional language need not contain the same
culpability requirement as other elements of the offense"); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676
n.9 (1975) (holding that defendant charged with assault of undercover federal law enforcement officer
need not know his victim was federal law enforcement officer and that "the existence of the fact that
confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act
made criminal by the federal statute").
169. See United States v. Jackson, i2o F.3d 8226, 1229 (iith Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (finding that
defendant could not present defense that he believed his prior convictions were under terms of firstoffender state statute for which record was expunged after service of term of probation); United States
v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352-53 (ioth Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant could not present defense that
he believed his civil rights had been restored following prior felony conviction).
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assured by a judge that, notwithstanding his prior felony conviction, he
could have guns for hunting purposes. 7 It allows the conviction of a
defendant who was assured by his counsel that he could possess
firearms.' 7' And it allows the conviction of defendants who were advised
by state judges, state prosecutors, and state probation officers that their
prior legal proceedings had not resulted in a criminal conviction.' 72 In
such cases-where a defendant believes that his prior conviction did not
disqualify him from possessing a firearm-the defendant will be barred
from trying to prove to the jury his innocent state of mind.
The apparent innocence rule has similarly operated to preclude a
defendant from establishing an innocent-state-of-mind defense in the
context of another firearms statute that regulates the possession of
firearms silencers. Without identifying any particular mental state, the
statute provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ...to receive
or possess a firearm [which includes a silencer] which is not identified by
a serial number as required by this chapter.' 73 Two federal appeals
courts have ruled that a defendant need only know that she possessed a
silencer and need not know that the silencer does not have a serial
number.'74 Accordingly, a defendant who believed that her silencer had a
serial number stamped on its side would be barred from presenting
evidence of her innocent state of mind.
A majority of federal circuit courts have also rejected requests for an
"innocent possession" defense to illegal gun possession charges."Ts Such a
defense might apply, for example, if a felon defendant only momentarily
touched a firearm before ridding himself of it or if a defendant took
170. See United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 320-21 (4th Cir. i99i).
171. See United States v. Powell, 513 F.2d 1249, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 1975).
172. See United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d 640, 641-42 (1ith Cir. 1985) (convicting defendant
despite reliance on advice of state judge and state prosecutor that prior nolo contendere plea to a
burglary charge did not constitute a prior conviction); United States v. Goodie, 524 F.2d 515, 517-I8
(5th Cir. I975) (finding probation officer's advice irrelevant to conviction but allowing it as a defense
against defendant's related specific intent offense of making a false statement on a federal firearms
form regarding his conviction history, for which defendant was thereby acquitted).
173. 26 U.S.C. § 5 861(i) (2000). A silencer is defined by statute to be a "firearm." 26 U.S.C.

§ 5845(a)(7)

(20oo).

174- See United States v. Ruiz, 253 F. 3 d 634, 638-39 (Iith Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Turnbough, Nos. 9602531, 96-2677, 1997 U.S. App. WL 264475, at *2 (7th Cir. May 14, 1997); cf.
United States v. Smith, No. 96-IOO44, 1997 WL 222328, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1997) (machine gun
without serial number).
175. Compare United States v. Holt, 464 F.3d Io, 107 (ist Cir. 2006) (rejecting "innocent
possession" defense), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2031 (2007), United States v. Gilbert, 43o F.3d 215, 220
(4th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Hendricks, 319 F.3d 993, 1007 (7th Cir. 2003), with United States
v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (allowing an "innocent possession" defense to a felon-inpossession charge where the facts show that "(i) the firearm was attained innocently and held with no
illicit purpose and (2) possession of the firearm was transitory- i.e., in light of the circumstances
presented, there is a good basis to find that the defendant took adequate measures to rid himself of
possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possible").
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possession of a firearm to move it away from a child. Again, the courts'
interpretive approach forecloses juries from considering evidence
negating a defendant's knowledge of wrongdoing.
C.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

As with immigration and firearms offenses, federal criminal
environmental cases pose undue risks of the conviction of innocentminded defendants. Two of the most commonly charged federal criminal
statutes176 are the federal Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which prohibits

"knowingly" discharging any pollutant to the waters of the United States
without a permit ,, and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
("RCRA"), which prohibits "knowingly" disposing, transporting, or
storing hazardous waste without a permit. Both statutes penalize the
handling or disposal of pollutants or hazardous waste without a
governmental permit. A majority of appeals courts continue to require a
defendant to have known only that she was discharging a pollutant or
hazardous waste; they do not require the government also to prove 7a9
defendant's knowledge that she lacked a regulatory permit to do so.
These rulings allow the conviction of defendants who genuinely but
mistakenly believed that they were authorized to discard pollutants in
the manner that they did. A defendant's conviction in such circumstances
cannot be justified by the maxim of "ignorance of the law is no excuse,"
because the defendant's knowledge of law is not at issue-the issue is her
knowledge of the fact that a permit was not obtained.
Accordingly, the environmental cases are but another example of
the underinclusive nature of the apparent innocence rule-that is, the
176. Michael O'Hear, Sentencing the Green Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and
Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 140 (2004) (listing most common federal
environmental statutes that are basis for criminal enforcement).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (20oo). The Clean Water Act ("CWA") prescribes up to three years'
imprisonment for any person who "knowingly violates ... any permit condition.., in a permit issued"
under the Clean Water Act. Id.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (2000). The federal hazardous waste law, known as the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), prescribes up to five years of imprisonment and a $50,000
fine for every day of violation for any person who "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes" of
"hazardous waste" without a permit. Id. See generally Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?:
Statutory Construction Under 42 U.S.C. § 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 187, 192-95 (1993) (describing the

history and scope of RCRA statute).
179. See United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F. 3 d 1031, 1043 (9th Cit. 2002) (noting that the

Clean Water Act "allows criminal penalties ...regardless of whether the polluter is cognizant of the
requirements of or even the existence of the permit," and therefore "[d]efendants' belief that permits
were in place is irrelevant to the determination of whether they knowingly engaged in conduct" that
violated the Clean Water Act); United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F. 3 d 432, 437-39
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant need not know that he lacked a permit to dispose hazardous
waste); United States v. Laughlin, tO F.3 d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1993) (same). But see United States v.
Wilson. i33 F.3 d 25I, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government must show defendant's
knowledge that he did not have a permit for water discharge).
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failure to require proof that may suggest a defendant acted with an
innocent state of mind. Yet the environmental statutes also highlight a
different failing of the courts' element-by-element interpretative
approach-one of rigid overinclusiveness in requiring, as to some
elements, a defendant's knowledge of factual details that cannot be said
to bear on a defendant's knowledge of wrongdoing. This fault is a byproduct of courts' decisions to require that a knowledge requirement
attach, if at all, to entire elements, even if a single element is defined in
great detail to include some aspects that bear on wrongfulness and other
aspects that do not bear on wrongfulness.
Indeed, the lesson from Staples is that a defendant must know the
precise factual characteristics of the object that she is alleged to have
unlawfully handled, provided that such particular factual characteristics
are what distinguish the object the defendant handled (e.g., a machine
gun), from another object that it would be perfectly lawful for the
defendant to handle (e.g., a semi-automatic assault rifle). Consistent with
the Model Penal Code's directive that knowledge be determined on an
element-by-element basis, it is a unitary, discontinuous inquiry-if a
defendant must "know" an element of the offense, a defendant must
"know" all the factual aspects of an element of the offense.
In environmental cases, the required knowledge of the "facts that
constitute the offense" (Bryan) may mean awareness of tediously
technical and arcane details well beyond the cognition of the most evilminded defendants. Consider, for example, a RCRA prosecution which
invariably requires the government to prove that a substance disposed of
by a defendant meets the detailed statutory definition of "hazardous
waste." If a particular waste is not specifically listed by the EPA as
"hazardous waste," then the only way it can qualify as "hazardous waste"
is if, when subject to forensic testing, it displays certain hazardous
characteristics for ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity.""
But, as Kathleen Brickey has noted, "merely determining whether a
waste is hazardous can be daunting," because the statutory "meaning of
'hazardous waste' is obscured by indeterminate regulatory terms of art,
relentless redefinition, and highly complex rules.""' For example, to
show that a particular liquid waste qualifies as a hazardous waste because
i8o. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (20o6); see also Am. Chemistry Council v. EPA, 337 F.3d to6o, io62-63

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing RCRA statutory scheme).
I8I. Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 527-28 (1996); see also Richard J.
Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L. J. 2407, 2434 (1995) (noting the complexity of environmental
regulations and testimony of one EPA official to the effect that there were only "five people in the
agency who understand what 'hazardous waste' is" and that "[w]hat's hazardous one year isn't [the
next]-[and what] wasn't hazardous yesterday, is hazardous tomorrow, because we've changed the

rules").
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of its ignitable characteristics, the government would have to show that
the substance
is a liquid, other than an aqueous solution containing less than twentyfour percent alcohol by volume and has flash point less than sixty
degrees Celsius (14o degrees Fahrenheit), as determined by a PenskyMartens Closed Cup Tester, using the test method specified in ASTM
Standard D-93-79 or D- 9 3-8o (incorporated by reference, see § 26o. 11),
or a Setaflash Closed Cup Tester, using the test method specified in
ASTM Standard D-3278-78 (incorporated by reference, see § 26o.ii),
or as determined by an equivalent test method approved by the
Administrator under procedures set forth in §§ 260.20 and 260.2 1.
Now let us suppose the police catch Samantha late one night
dumping a barrel of green-looking sludge in the woods off a city parking
lot. The EPA tests the sludge as described above and finds that it is
indeed "ignitable" and therefore within the legal definition of
"hazardous waste." Samantha admits to the police that she works as a
truck driver and that she decided to just dump the waste where she
thought no one would notice it instead of taking it to the facility where
the company usually ships its waste. She readily admits she knew the
waste was "nasty stuff" but she had never dealt with it before, had no
idea what chemicals were in it, and certainly did not know if it was
ignitable. Under Staples, Samantha must be acquitted. She has some
sense that the waste is noxious but she does not know the specific factual
characteristics that qualify the substance as "hazardous waste" subject to
the RCRA's prohibition. She is no different than the defendant in
Staples, who knew he had a lethal weapon but did not know the precise
factual characteristics that brought his weapon within the statutory
definition of a firearm.
The absurdity of exonerating Samantha becomes even clearer if we
suppose that she also told the police when they arrested her that she
knew she did not have a permit to dump the waste and she dumped the
waste where she did just to "settle a score" she had against the owner of
the property. Under the apparent innocence rule, Samantha's admissions
are irrelevant and subject to exclusion from the evidence at trial.
Samantha need not be proven to have had any idea whether she had a
permit and she certainly need not be proven to have known or intended
to do anything wrong-she just needs to know the exact facts about what
she dumped (which she certainly does not).
Not surprisingly, but without consistent principle, the courts have
declined to apply Staples to environmental dumpers like Samantha.
Instead, for hazardous waste cases, the courts continue to require only
182. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2i(a)(I) (2006). Highly detailed testing procedures are similarly required to
show that a substance is some other form of characteristic waste, such as corrosive, reactive, or toxic.
See id. § 261.22-24.
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that a defendant be aware of the generally harmful nature or quality of
the substance or waste that has been mishandled (i.e., that it was not
water), without requiring knowledge of the added details that are
nonetheless necessary to satisfy the statute.' 3 It is hard to argue with the
common sense of the courts' approach in this regard, but it cannot be
reconciled with Staples or the Court's avowals in Dixon and Bryan that a
"knowing" requirement means knowledge of the "facts that constitute
the offense." To paraphrase Herbert Packer in a different context, the
courts have decided
that "mens rea is required for every offense, except
' 4
when it isn't.'
The courts follow the same incoherent approach for criminal cases
under the Clean Air Act. In United States v. Weintraub, a real estate
developer supervised a scheme in which day laborers were sent into a
building under renovation and directed to "rip and strip" asbestos from
the building's pipes and boilers without wearing any protective
equipment or taking other measures to prevent the inhalation of
carcinogenic asbestos fibers. 58 The Clean Air Act, however, does not
apply to all forms of asbestos; it applies only to "regulated asbestos
containing material," which is technically defined in part to include only:
(i) asbestos that is friable in form (i.e., likely to become airborne upon
removal because it can be crushed to a powder form by hand pressure),
and (2) asbestos that is present in more than one percent concentration
as determined by scientific Polarized Light Microscopy testing. ' 6
On appeal from his trial court conviction, Weintraub argued-in
reliance on Staples and X-Citement Video-that the trial court erred
because it allowed the jury to convict him only on the basis of his
knowledge that the substance was asbestos and that the trial court did
not further instruct the jury to determine that he knew the asbestos was
friable (which was what would make the asbestos dangerous) or present
in the requisite amounts as required to be subject to regulation.' The
Second Circuit rejected his argument, concluding that he need only have
known the material to be asbestos, because such knowledge sufficed
to
8
put him on notice that the substance could be subject to regulation. 1
As in the case of Samantha, Weintraub cannot be reconciled with the
requirement of Staples that a defendant know the precise factual
characteristics of the material that make it subject to regulation. I do not
183. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 167 F.3d 1176, ii8i (7th Cir. 1999).
184. See Singer & Husak, supra note 12, at 859 n..
185. 273 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2001). I was one of the trial prosecutors in the case and defended

the case for the government on appeal.
186. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (defining "friable asbestos material" and "regulated asbestoscontaining material").
187. See Weintraub, 273 F.3 d at 144-45.
188. See id. at 151.
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endorse a requirement that environmental defendants be proved to have
known the highly precise factual characteristics of pollutants and toxins
that they dump or mishandle. My point is that such examples underscore
the deficiencies of the current all-or-nothing, element-by-element
interpretive approach. Judges fashion statute-by-statute, ad hoc formulae
of what conduct is "innocent" or not. The alternative, as I suggest in Part
III of this Article, is to let juries decide on a case-by-case basis if
defendants knew they were doing wrong.
D. THE MODEL PENAL CODE "MATERIAL ELEMENTS" APPROACH
The Model Penal Code's "material elements" approach suffers from
the same difficulty as the Supreme Court's free-form apparent innocence
rule. The Code would require knowledge (or recklessness) as to each
"material element," and it defines the term "material element" in a
negative sense to include "an element that does not relate exclusively to
the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter
similarly unconnected with the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense." '89 Just as with the
apparent innocence rule, the Code leaves it to the courts to decide-as a
categorical matter of statutory interpretation-if particular element facts
are connected to the harm or evil targeted by the statute.
Suppose, for example, that Sally walks into a bank one day, reaches
over the teller's counter, grabs a wad of bills from the cash drawer, then
runs away only to be caught by the police with $i,ioo in her bag. She is
charged under the federal statute that prescribes up to ten years
imprisonment for the theft of more than $i,ooo from a bank whose
deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).'- But Sally is just a dumb thief. She did not count her money
before she left the bank, and she has never heard of the FDIC, much less
that it insures bank deposits. Must Sally be proved to know that she took
more than $i,ooo? That the bank's deposits were insured by the FDIC?
Under an honest application of the Model Penal Code's "material
elements" approach, a court would conclude that Sally must know both
these facts. The $i,ooo monetary threshold certainly relates to the "harm
or evil . . .sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense,"
because the very purpose of the statute is to stop people from taking the
bank's money-the more money taken, the worse the offense. Although
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(0) (1962). If the legislature has not given element-by-element
guidance as to the required mental state, a statute that contains a general "knowing" requirement
would require "knowledge" as to each material element; a statute that is textually silent as to mental
state would require at least recklessness as to each material element. See id. § 2.02(3)-(4).
19o. i8 U.S.C. § 2113(b), (f) (2000).For the theft of more than $I,ooo, a defendant is subject to a
felony penalty of up to ten years' imprisonment; for the theft of less than $i,ooo, a defendant is subject
to a misdemeanor penalty of one year imprisonment. See id. § 211 3(b).
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the FDIC element could be viewed merely as federally jurisdictional in
nature, it could also be said that Congress had a substantive interest in
furnishing special protection for federal banks-as opposed to state or
local banks-because their obligations are guaranteed by federal
taxpayers. 9 ' Hence, the FDIC element may not be "exclusively"
jurisdictional in nature as the Code's "material elements" standard
requires. In short, under the Model Penal Code's "material elements"
approach, Sally likely goes free for failure of the government to prove
her knowledge that more than $i,ooo was taken and that the bank was
federally insured.
In short, as discussed above, the apparent innocence rule has failed
in a wide range of federal general intent crimes to protect the innocence
purposes it vows to serve. Time and again defendants are convicted
despite exculpatory knowledge concerning one or more elements of the
offense. The Model Penal Code's material elements offense fares no
better than the apparent innocence rule because of its similarly
categorical nature that delegates to judges exclusively the power to
determine what conduct is wrong.
III. TOWARD AUTHENTIC INNOCENCE
It is time for the Court to consider a new approach to the resolution
of culpability for federal general intent crimes-a new approach that I
shall call the authentic innocence rule of jury-found culpability. Rather
than selecting what facts a defendant must be proved to know, the courts
should instruct juries simply to determine if the defendant knew or
believed that she was engaged in the kind of wrongdoing that is
prohibited by the statute charged against her. I discuss below the
justification for jury-found culpability and how it could easily be
implemented by the courts. Lastly, I respond to several potential
objections.
A.

LETTING THE JURY DECIDE

I start from a baseline presumption that a defendant should not
stand convicted of a crime if she did not know at the time that what she
was doing was wrong. In Justice Jackson's oft-quoted words, "'our
substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious
will,"' and this "'postulates a free agent confronted with a choice
between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do

191. Indeed, Sally's argument would be strengthened by the fact that the current state of
Commerce Clause law does not require Congress even to include an express jurisdictional element.
The courts routinely infer the existence of federal jurisdiction simply from the nature of the class of
commercial activities regulated, rather than any case-specific jurisdictional link. See, e.g., United States
v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (1 ithCir. 1999); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3 d 667, 676-77 (5th
Cir. 1997).
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wrong." '9 2 Judge Posner has similarly observed that "[i]t is wrong to
convict a person of a crime if he had no reason to believe that the act for
which he was convicted was a crime, or even that it was wrongful." '93 The

apparent innocence rule is in purpose consistent with the historical shift
from a consequentialist theory of punishment embodied in the public
welfare doctrine to retributivist theory that focuses on a defendant's
moral blameworthiness.'94
This is not to say that there could never be conduct so imminently
dangerous that Congress would not be justified for deterrence purposes
if it imposed strict liability. But the focus here is on the default principle
of culpability that should apply for general intent crimes, including the
routine gun, drug, immigration, and environmental cases that fill most of
the federal criminal docket. For these types of cases, and consistent with
the Court's avowed goal to protect an innocent-minded defendant, it is
most reasonable to presume an intent of Congress that the defendant be
proved to have known she was doing wrong.
What does it mean to say that a defendant must have known she was
doing "wrong"? This is an issue that the courts and commentators have
long resolved in the context of insanity defenses and the traditional
requirement of the M'Naghten rule that a defendant have known the
difference between "right" and "wrong." A defendant knows she is doing
wrong if she knows her conduct actually violates the law or-if ignorant
of particular legal prohibitions-she knows her conduct crosses the
boundary of what society believes to be permissible.'95
This latter aspect incorporates the moral perspective of society, not
192. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Introduction
to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927)).
193. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 293 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
194. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1529 (1992) (noting that retributivist
viewpoint runs contrary to "legal positivist" conceptions that "eschew[] any necessary connection
between legal liability rules and 'private' moralities"); Donald A. Dripps, FundamentalRetribution
Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VANO. L. R. 1383, 1424-26 (2003)
(comparing types of retributivist and utilitarian theories in light of psychological evidence that blame
is disproportionately attributed to the character of the accused rather than the circumstances she
faced); Huigens, supra note 1O9, at 818-i9 (2002) (discussing historical shift away from
consequentialist theories of punishment); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert.
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997) (contrasting utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment and
contending that retributivist policy- "a criminal law that assigns punishment in ways that closely
reflects the community's intuitions about appropriate condemnation and punishment" -ends up
promoting utilitarian concerns for "effectiveness in controlling crime," because of its "greater power
to gain compliance with society's rules of lawful conduct").
195. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 493 (Wash. 1983) ("[I]n discussing the term 'moral'
wrong, it is important to note that it is society's morals, and not the individual's morals, that are the
standard for judging moral wrong under M'Naghten."); see also State v. Cole. 755 A.2d 202. 209-It
(Conn. 2000) (holding that defendant's knowledge of illegality not enough to establish knowledge of
wrong if defendant believed society's morals would allow his conduct).
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just one individual or the defendant on trial. Just as "[t]he anarchist is
not at liberty to break the law because he reasons that all government is
wrong,"' 9 a defendant is not free to be judged solely by her own
assessment of the wrongfulness of her conduct.'" The defendant in such
cases would be aware that she is crossing a societally-prohibited line,
even if she does not agree where society has drawn that line.
Once it is accepted that criminal penalties should be reserved only
for those who choose to do something they know to be wrong, the
relevant question is what adjudication method best ensures this result.
Should courts resolve knowledge-of-wrongfulness issues as a categorical
matter of law-that is, by deciding as an exercise of statutory
interpretation which of the several particular factual elements, if known
to a hypothetical defendant, mean that the defendant knew she was
doing wrong? Or should trial courts instruct juries to resolve a particular
defendant's knowledge of wrongfulness on a case-by-case basis-that is,
to determine if a particular defendant knew enough about her conduct
and all the surrounding circumstances to know that she was doing
wrong?
Trial juries are the better choice. Each case potentially involves a
unique mix of facts that bear on a particular defendant's knowledge that
she was doing wrong, facts that courts do not always account for when
crafting the contours of particular statutes. As Kyron Huigens has
recognized, "[b]ecause moral condemnation is subtly responsive to
variations in conduct and context, the public expects the criminal law to
be subtly responsive in the same way . . . "198 Only the jury at trial is
positioned and normatively able to account for all the defendant-specific
facts; juries consider an actual case, instead of imagining a typical one as
judges do when deciding wrongfulness as a matter of statutory
interpretation.I99
Juries are the constitutionally preferred decisionmaking body for
matters bearing on a criminal defendant's responsibility. As the Supreme
Court noted in making the right of jury trial applicable to the States, the
framers recognized that "[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried
196. People v. Schmidt, i Io N.E. 945, 950 (N.Y. 1915) ("The anarchist is not at liberty to break the
law because he reasons that all government is wrong. The devotee of a religious cult that enjoins
polygamy or human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from responsibility before the law.").
197. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 493 ("If wrong meant moral wrong judged by the individual's own
conscience, this would seriously undermine the criminal law, for it would allow one who violated the
law to be excused from criminal responsibility solely because, in his own conscience, his act was not
morally wrong.").
198. Huigens, supra note lo9.
i99. Because the jury is assigned a decision-making role under either my approach or the apparent
innocence rule, this Article does not explore the empirical evidence concerning the general accuracy
of a criminal jury's findings. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-59
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1966) (suggesting 75.4% agreement rate between juries and judges).
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by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge," and that "[i]f the defendant preferred the commonsense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it."" °
In addition, the jury's multi-individual, deliberative nature makes it
better positioned to resolve a particular defendant's knowledge of
wrongfulness. The presence of twelve decision makers ensures the
inclusion of a far broader range of views and life experiences than those
of a single judge. As Justice Breyer has noted, "jurors possess an
important comparative advantage over judges," and "[in principle, they
are more attuned to 'the community's moral sensibility,' because they
'reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of. the
community as a whole ..... .Rachel Barkow and Jenia Iontcheva Turner
have convincingly emphasized this advantage of the jury in their
proposals to expand the jury's role at sentencing.2 '
In defense of the apparent innocence rule, it could be argued that it
is not just a single trial judge but ultimately multiple judges in the chain
of appellate review that resolve issues of federal statutory interpretation,
such as what particular factual elements a defendant must be proved to
have known. But no more than three judges of a federal appeals court
are likely to take up the issue for any one case, and then their judgment
will be binding on all other judges within their circuit. It is the rare case
that receives en banc review in a federal court of appeals, much less
certiorari review by the full Supreme Court. 3
Although championing the apparent innocence rule, John Shepard
Wiley concedes a vulnerability: that judges may impose their personal
200.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). Because of the multi-individual and deliberative-process nature of the jury, this argument
applies with less force in the relatively rare cases where judges serve as the fact finder at trial. See Sean
Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (1995)
(noting difficulty in obtaining federal data on number of non-jury trials and extrapolating from
available data that only 14% of federal criminal trials are not before a jury).
at 47-83; Jenia lontcheva Turner, Jury Sentencing as Democratic
202. Barkow, supra note i2,
Process, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 341-42 (2003); see also Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries
of 'Apprendi-land':Statutory Minimums and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377,
451 (2002) (noting that "jury verdicts communicate important communal judgments" and the role of
the jury as "conscience of the community").
203. See Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit: An Empirical Study, 68 TENN.
L. REV. 771, 771 (2000) ("In 1998 and 1999, for example, en banc dispositions accounted for only onethird of one percent of the cases decided by the federal appellate courts."); Jeffrey 0. Cooper &
Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 685, 721-22 (2001) (noting the "rarity of en banc review" in federal appeals courts); The Justices'
Caseload, www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (noting
certiorari review for approximately one hundred cases of seven thousand presented each term).
201.

HA STINGS LA W JOURNA L

[VOL. 59:137

views of morality in deciding what facts are not "innocent" and that a
defendant should therefore be proved to know.0 4 He cautions judges to
be aware of this risk and urges them to "consult popular or consensus
moral codes, not their own."2 5 According to Wiley, judges should not
ask: "'Is X action immoral?' but rather, 'Should a reasonable person
engaged in X conduct be aware of a risk that a consensus of Americans
considers X conduct to be morally wrongful? '''...
But judges will scarcely have reliable data about what particular
conduct "Americans" consider to be wrong. Are they to rely on news
media polls? Social science research? Wikipedia? What assurance can
there be of any recent data directed at the particular moral issue
presented in a case? Rather than asking judges to surmise what other
people think is wrong, the better choice is to let a jury make this
common-sense, community-contextual judgment.
Indeed, an individual juror's sense of morality will implicitly tend to
account for and accommodate the moral viewpoints of others in the
community. As Paul Robinson and John Darley have noted, the average
person does not gauge wrongfulness simply by reference to her own
"personal view but on an intuitive but grounded notion of justice that the
speaker believes is shared by the community of moral individuals."2"
And as Stuart Green observes, "[W]hen we say that a person is culpable
or that an act is wrongful or harmful, we mean, at least in part, that a
consensus of society would view the person or the act in that manner."'°8
Among the available alternatives, a trial jury is the best weathervane
of the "popular or consensus moral code." To be sure, there may be
some regional differences in viewpoint. The Sixth Amendment requires a
federal criminal jury to be selected "from the State and the district
wherein the crime shall have been previously ascertained by law,"" ° and
this may suggest, as Stanton Krauss has noted, "that federal juries are
expected to express a local view of the facts, which may or may not be in
accord with the view of most Americans .....
But this regional influence is
counterbalanced by the fact that almost all federal prosecution decisions
are made in the first place at the local level by United States Attorney's
Offices and without case-specific input or direction from national
officials of the Department of Justice. Moreover, the Constitution's "fair

204. Wiley, supra note 12, at 1072.
205. Id. at 1074.
2o6. Id. at 1075.
207. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS

AND THE CRIMINAL LAW t (Westview Press 1995).
2o8. Green, supra note 22, at 1554.
209. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
210. Stanton D. Krauss, Thinking Clearly About Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, 70 IND. L. J. 921, 922

0995).
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cross-section principle" means that "jury wheels, pools of names, panels,
or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude
distinctive groups in the community ..... This is a further safeguard
against the prospect that the determination of knowledge of
wrongfulness may be made by persons whose views are not
representative of the community.
Of equal significance is that federal criminal juries must be
unanimous. Unanimity means extreme views will tend to be screened
out, and consensus will coalesce on core conceptions of what conduct is
morally acceptable. This filtering process will tend toward convergence
on moral conceptions that are truly representative of broader society and
that appropriately serve as a benchmark for a determination of
wrongfulness.
By contrast, panels of appellate judges need not be unanimous. A
simple majority of judges will carry the day, as in Staples where only five
of nine justices were convinced that possessing a semi-automatic gun (as
opposed to a machine gun) was apparently innocent conduct. In Ratzlaf,
only five justices were convinced that the prohibition against structuring
of bank deposits was a sufficiently "complex" crime that warranted an
interpretation of "willful" to require knowledge of the law. Such internal
divisions among appellate judges about what conduct is "wrong"
undermines the legitimacy of their normative determinations of what is
"innocent" for future cases.
Perhaps most significantly from the perspective of a criminal
defendant, she has a say over who sits on her jury. She may exercise
peremptory challenges and thereby remove prospective jurors whom she
fears may harbor views against her. 1 2 By contrast, a criminal defendant
has no right to pick the judge who sits on her case to decide what
particular facts she must be proved to have known. A defendant's rights
to assert peremptory challenges at jury selection are further insurance
against the imposition of non-representative views about what conduct is
'"wrong."
To ask jurors to determine a defendant's knowledge of wrongfulness
rather than simply her knowledge of particular facts is a significant step
toward restoring normative values to the culpability inquiry. A true rule
of mandatory culpability would let the jury decide if a defendant knew
she was doing wrong.
The jury-found culpability approach also redresses unfairness that
may result from cases of enhanced liability, as in the case of Ancelmo
Figueroa, the immigration inspector who was convicted for assisting the
illegal reentry of an aggravated felon despite the absence of proof to
211. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (975).

212. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (peremptory challenges).
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show that he knew he was assisting an aggravated felon. In contrast to
the categorical approach of the apparent innocence rule, jury-found
culpability would allow for a more discriminating assessment of
culpability for cases like Figueroa's. In some cases, the evidence will
show actual knowledge of the aggravating circumstance, such as evidence
that an immigration inspector charged higher prices for certain kinds of
aliens. On such facts, the jury would almost certainly conclude that the
inspector knew he was engaged in just the kind of wrongdoing targeted
by the statute. But in other cases (like Figueroa's) where evidence of the
inspector's actual knowledge is scant, the jury will fall back on its
common sense and experience to determine if Figueroa nonetheless
knew he was doing the type of wrong prohibited by the statute. To
inform this judgment, the prosecution can establish Figueroa's length of
service as an immigration inspector, the extent of his training and
instruction in the hazards of allowing the entry of criminal aliens, and the
general incidence of entry into the United States of aliens with criminal
histories (as opposed to other illegal aliens). If, as was true in Figueroa's
case, the inspector has engaged in a pattern of allowing other aliens to
illegally enter, then this will favor the prosecutor's argument-that
Figueroa must have appreciated the risk that some of the illegal aliens he
was admitting would have a criminal past. But if the evidence suggests
little likelihood that Figueroa would have reason to know of Garcia's
criminal history, then the jury could acquit Figueroa of the assistance-toan-aggravated-felon crime, in favor of convicting him for the lesser crime
of assistance-to-an-excludable-alien. Jury-found culpability allows a
calibration of culpability, while the apparent innocence rule does not.
B.

IMPLEMENTING JURY-FOUND CULPABILITY FOR GENERAL INTENT
CRIMES

Jury-found culpability could be implemented by courts in a simple
manner for federal general intent crimes. First, as a jury is already
required to do, it must decide on the existence of each base factual
element of the charged offense (apart from whether the defendant knew
of any of these facts). Second, as to the critical issue of what a defendant
knew, a trial court would no longer instruct the jury to decide if the
defendant knew any particular one, two, or more of the base element
facts-there would be no more element-by-element knowledge
requirements. Instead, as to the issue of the defendant's knowledge, the
court would instruct the jury to decide more generally if the defendant
knew she was engaged in the kind of wrongdoing that the statute was
designed to prohibit.
Before turning to what this new standard means, let's consider a
preliminary question: are courts able to start instructing juries as I
suggest without authorization from Congress? Yes-the federal courts
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have broad common law authority to determine the manner in which
they instruct juries at trial and to decide the framework for how juries
should resolve the elements of a criminal statute. Although the Due
Process Clause requires proof of each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt,"3 no decision of the Supreme Court further requires as
a constitutional matter that juries address a defendant's knowledge of
any particular facts on an element-by-element basis.1 4
As with the apparent innocence rule, jury-found culpability would
operate as no more than a default rule of statutory interpretation. Subject
to any constitutional limits that might constrain Congress from
dispensing altogether with mens rea requirements (a subject that I do not
address),"5 Congress would remain free for any particular statute to
require that the jury determine a defendant's knowledge of particular
facts rather than her knowledge of wrongfulness. In such cases, strict
liability would result from a clear legislative policy choice of Congress
rather than an implicit interpretive choice of the courts.
Federal juries are no strangers to the type of culpability inquiry I
suggest. They already do it for a wide range of specific intent cases. For
conspiracy crimes, juries must determine that the defendant acted
knowingly and willfully with a purpose to disregard the law." ' Other
federal criminal statutes expressly require a defendant to act with
fraudulent intent or with knowledge of unlawful activity." 7
As noted above, the jury would not decide simply if the defendant
knew she was doing anything wrong. Instead, the jury would decide if the
defendant knew she was engaged in wrongdoing of the type that is the
target of the criminal statute charged against her. This limitation on the
scope of wrongfulness is essential to ensure a correlation between the
crime charged against the defendant and what the defendant knew she
did wrong. It would prevent a jury, as Justice Scalia feared in his dissent
in Bryan, from convicting a defendant for unlicensed firearms dealing
solely because he knew it was "wrong" to have double-parked his car in
the course of gun-selling activity." '
The limitation would also preclude a conviction in circumstances like
the classic English case of Regina v. Cunningham, in which a defendant
plundered coins from a natural-gas meter in the basement of his house
213. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur,

421

U.S. 684, 698 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

214. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394.408 (1980).
215. See generally Michaels, supra note i5; Hopkins, supra note i5.

216. See, e.g., United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Bieganowski, 313 F. 3 d 264, 276 (5th Cir. 2002).
217. See, e.g., I8 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 2113(c) (knowing receipt of stolen
bank property), 1956 (money laundering requiring knowledge of transactions as involving proceeds
from some form of unlawful activity).
218. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 202 (5998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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but, in so doing, allowed a gas leak to develop that eventually injured an
elderly neighbor.219 The defendant pleaded guilty to the theft but was
further charged and convicted for maliciously causing a noxious thing to
be taken by another person so as to endanger her life. ° The trial court
had instructed the jury that "malice" was shown by the defendant's
theft.2" On appeal, the defendant's conviction was reversed for lack of
any evidence that the defendant intended by his theft to allow the gas
2
leak or to cause personal injury."
Jury-found culpability would require the jury to decide if the
defendant knew her wrongfulness to be of the general type targeted by
the statute. To require more-that the defendant knew her wrongdoing
to be of the exact type targeted by the statute-would effectively require
the defendant to know the precise law charged against her. A defendant
could argue that her lack of knowledge of any single factual element,
even of a technical aspect or jurisdictional-type element that does not
correspond to the harm involved, means that she did not know her
conduct to be targeted by the statute. The result would exempt lawignorant defendants who maliciously engage in conduct that Congress
intended to forbid when it enacted the statute.
Juries already embark on a similar "scope of the statute" inquiry in
civil tort cases where a plaintiff attempts to use a defendant's breach of a
criminal or regulatory statute as evidence of the defendant's negligence.
In such cases, juries are instructed that breach of the statute is evidence
of negligence but only "'if you also find that the statute at question was
intended to prevent the specific harm which occurred.'2 ' . 3 In the same
manner, a criminal trial jury can feasibly decide if the defendant
knowingly engaged in wrongdoing of the kind that is targeted by the
statute charged.
In any event, the jury's focus would be on the defendant's
knowledge of wrongdoing, rather than her knowledge of particular facts.
For this reason, a jury-found culpability rule would not require a
defendant to know all or any particular element facts of the offense. Of
course, the defendant's proven knowledge of specific element facts
would be highly relevant to the jury's wrongfulness query, and there
would almost certainly be a large overlap in many cases. For Sam's case,

2I9. Regina v. Cunningham, ['9571 2 Q.B. 396,398.
220. Id. at 398-99.
Id.
Id. at 401.
223. See Hopkins v. Medeioros, 724 N.E.2d 336, 348 n.I9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting jury
instruction); see also Stafford v. Borden, 625 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that
defendant's sale of third-party gasoline in type of container prohibited by law was not basis for
recovery by a plaintiff who was a victim of third-party's arson because "[t]he requirement that gasoline
be sold only in an approved container, however, bears no relationship to the prevention of arson").
221.

222.
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a jury would doubtlessly evaluate what Sam believed to be in the trunk
of his car in order to decide if Sam knew he was acting wrongfully. If the
jury found that Sam knew he had a bomb in the car, its focus would turn
to the ostensible reason for Sam's possession of an unregistered bomb.
The jury could consider Sam's background, his experience, and any
reasons (if offered by Sam) to decide if he knew he was doing wrong.

C.

THE OBJECTIONS

This final section addresses four anticipated objections to an
authentic innocence rule of jury-found culpability: (i) that jury-found
culpability contravenes the principle that ignorance of the law is no
excuse to criminal liability; (2) that jury-found culpability will result in
jury nullification; (3) that jury-found culpability raises notice and legality
concerns; and (4) that rather than instituting jury-found culpability, the
courts should simply allow a defendant to present and prove a good-faith
defense to general intent crimes.
i. Jury-Found Culpability and Mistakes of Law
One predictable objection to jury-found culpability will be that it
conflicts with the venerable maxim that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse." But requiring the defendant to know she was doing wrong does
not require the defendant to know the law. Any possible confusion can
be resolved by the trial court instructing the jury that, although it must
determine whether the defendant knew she was engaged in wrongdoing,
the government need not prove that the defendant knew of the statute
that has been charged against her. This type of instruction is already used
for federal specific intent crimes, such as conspiracy, for which the
government must prove a defendant's purpose to join in an unlawful
scheme but not a defendant's knowledge of the underlying law.224 Of
course, if the evidence suggests that the defendant happens to know of
the specific law charged against her and that she is violating that law,
then this would be conclusive evidence that the defendant knew she was
doing wrong.
Beyond the core principle that a defendant need not know of the
specific law charged against her, the ignorance-of-law principle is
properly understood not to relieve the prosecution from proving a
defendant's knowledge of law other than the law charged against her
where such "other" law forms the basis for one of the elements of a
criminal offense. A classic example is Regina v. Smith, in which the
government charged a defendant tenant with damaging certain fixtures
that he had installed in an apartment. 5 The court concluded that the
defendant's ignorance of the legal rule deeming the fixtures to belong to
224- See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 .687 (1975).
225.

Regina v. Smith, ['9741 1 Q.B. 354.
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the landlord was a valid defense to the charge that he wrongfully
destroyed the fixtures.26

Many of the statutory examples that I discuss in Part II above
arguably involved such ignorance-of-other-law circumstances (e.g., an
alien's lack of knowledge that she did not have consent of the Attorney
General to reenter the United States, a felon-in-possession defendant's
belief that his prior offense was not a felony, Sam's belief that his
explosive device was registered for use at his construction job-site, or a
hazardous waste dumper's belief that he had a permit to dispose of
waste). Of course, these scenarios might just as easily be re-framed to
present mistakes of fact rather than mistakes of law (e.g., that the felonin-possession defendant believed his lawyer's assurance that no
conviction had ever entered or that the waste dumper was not aware that
a permit had not been obtained from the relevant agency).
Academics have long criticized the ephemeral distinction between
"mistakes of fact" that exonerate criminal defendants and "mistakes of
law" that are deemed irrelevant to criminal culpability. 7 Classic
examples abound of the senselessness of the distinction, such as "Mr.
Fact" and "Mr. Law" -two friends who go hunting on October 15, within
the lawful hunting season from October I to November 308 Mr. Fact,

however, thought the date was September 15, and Mr. Law thought the
lawful hunting season was only during the month of November, and both
are prosecuted for the crime of attempting to hunt out of season. 2 9
Although both are plainly equally culpable, Mr. Fact is exonerated
because his mistake was one of fact as to what date it was, while Mr. Law
is convicted because he misunderstood the law as to the dates of the legal
hunting season. 3' Both were mistaken, but Mr. Law is convicted only
because he made the wrong mistake. 3'
This senseless distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of
fact is further support for refocusing the inquiry on whether the
defendant believed she was doing wrong and not why she thought she
226.

Id.; see also Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and Formalism: What Happens if We Define

Mistake of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 518 (2001) (noting that "a mistaken view of civil property
law can exculpate if it leads the defendant to believe he has a right to the property" and that "such a
mistake of property law is always a defense to larceny").
227. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 380 n.26 (1984); Mark Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 630-33 (1981);
Leonard, supra note 226, at 519. The Model Penal Code excuses both mistakes of law and mistakes of
fact if the mistake negates a material element of the offense. Model Penal Code, § 2.04(I)(a) (1962).

H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
599 (7th ed. 2001).

228. SANFORD
MATERIALS
229.

CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND

Id.

Id.
"We made too many wrong mistakes!" remarked Yogi Berra, the famously quotable baseball
catcher, when asked why the New York Yankees lost the 196o World Series. See Yogi Berra Official
Website, http://yogiberra.com/yogi-isms.html (last visited Oct. 3",2007).
230.
231.
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was not doing wrong. In any event, even assuming a conflict between
jury-found culpability and the mistake of law doctrine, this does not
make jury-found culpability any less principled than the apparent
innocence rule that is in force today. Although the Supreme Court has
suggested adherence to "the background presumption that every citizen
knows the law,. 3 it routinely construes general intent statutes to require
proof that the defendant knew of the specific law charged against her, as
in Cheek (tax law), Ratzlaf (anti-structuring), and Liparota (food stamp
regulations).233
Perhaps most significant, the jury-found culpability approach aligns
with the true purpose behind the principle that ignorance of the law is no
excuse. As Dan Kahan has demonstrated, the conventional "Holmesian"
basis for the ignorance principle is a "liberal positivist" concept that
people should have incentives to learn the law, apart from any moral
values that the law may represent. 3 ' Contrary to this conventional view,
Kahan shows that the ignorance principle is more convincingly defended
by reference to "legal moralism"-the notion that the "law is suffused
with morality and, as a result, can't ultimately be identified or applied...
without the making of moral judgments," and "that individuals are
appropriately judged by the law not only for the law-abiding quality of
their actions but also for the moral quality of their values, 2 motivations,
35
and emotions-in a word, for the quality of their characters.
Kahan combines "legal moralism" with what he calls the "prudence
of obfuscation" -that is, the incentive of persons to learn the details of
law so that they can specifically tailor their conduct to comply even in
ways that they know not to be moral or in the spirit of the law.36 "The
more readily individuals can discover the law's content, the more readily
they'll be able to discern, and exploit, the gaps between what's immoral
and what's illegal. ' 37 From this Kahan argues that the reason the law
denies an ignorance excuse is to discourage citizens from strategically
acquiring knowledge of the law for evasion purposes3 8 The ignorance
principle encourages moral behavior, because "if a citizen suspects the
law fails to prohibit some species of immoral conduct, the only certain
way to avoid criminal punishment is to be a good person rather than a
232. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (998) (declining to require defendant's knowledge
of actual law charged against him even where statute required that defendant act "willfully").
233. For law review articles making this point that the Court has resurrected a mistake-of-law
defense, see Richard S.Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of
Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 217, 218 (1997), and Bruce R. Grace,
Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1399-1400 (1986).
234. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law, supra note 28, at 127-28.
235. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis omitted).
236. Id. at 129 (emphasis omitted).
237. Id.

238. Id.
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bad one." 3 9

Consistent with Kahan's understanding of the purpose served by the
ignorance principle, jury-found culpability acknowledges the suffusion of
criminal law prohibitions with moral concepts of wrongfulness, while
empowering the jury to weed out strategic law evaders. Consider again
the case of Waldemar Ratzlaf-whose conduct was anything but
innocent, as evidenced by his traversing from bank to bank to deposit
gambling proceeds after being advised of the currency transaction
reporting law, and with awareness that he was under scrutiny from the
Internal Revenue Service. 4 '
In light of the theoretical possibility that other hypothetical
defendants could "innocently" structure cash deposits (such as a
businessman seeking simply to conceal his transaction of large amounts
of cash from would-be robbers), the Court in Ratzlaf applied the
apparent innocence rule to conclude as a matter of blanket statutory
interpretation that any defendant charged with structuring cash deposits
must be proved to know structuring to be illegal. 4 ' Jury-found culpability
would have allowed a more tailored inquiry. The jury could distinguish
between the tactical Ratzlaf and a future defendant who actually
engaged in structuring for innocent-minded reasons. As Holmes notes,
"[ult needs no further explanation to show that, when the particular
defendant does for any reason foresee what an ordinary man of
reasonable prudence would not have foreseen, the ground of exemption
[from liability] no longer applies." 42
Moreover, because jury-found culpability is not categorical in the
nature of a rule of statutory interpretation, it does not suffer from the
same defect that Kahan identifies for the rule of lenity, which would
require interpretation of a statute in a criminal defendant's favor even
for cases where it is clear that a defendant "ha[s] deliberately engaged in
socially undesirable conduct" but who, because of the ambiguity that can
be urged under the rule of lenity, "hope[s] to avoid punishment on the
'
basis of an unanticipated gap in the law."243
In short, jury-found
culpability affords a more discriminating appraisal of defendants who
engage in strategic law-evading activity, consistent with the purpose for
negating an ignorance-of-law defense.
2.
Jury Nullification
A jury-found culpability approach will not open the flood gates for
"jury nullification," at least as that term is properly understood. "Jury

239. Id.
240. Ratzlaf v. United States, 5In U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
241. Id. at 149.
242.

See

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

243. Kahan, Lenity, supra note 28, at 415.

48 (Little, Brown & Co. I963).
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nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged."" Jury-found culpability
does not set guilty defendants free, but only defendants who did not
know they were doing wrong. Under the jury-found culpability approach,
the jury would still be instructed that it must accept the judge's
determinations of law and that it could not decline to return a verdict
simply because it does not agree with the law. Moreover, a jury would
still receive the standard cautionary instructions that guard against
consideration of rendering a verdict on the basis of pure sympathy for
the defendant or the defendant's race, religion, or ethnicity. 45
Jury-found culpability would empower the jury to acquit in cases
where the defendant knows some or all of the facts of her offense but
nonetheless did not know she was doing wrong. Consider the well-known
case of Wisconsin v. Reed, which involved an ex-felon (Leroy Reed) who
was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. "46
Reed was a man of very limited mental capacity who took a mail-order
course about how to become a private investigator and who then bought
a gun as recommended by the course materials. 47 One day he stood
(without his gun) by the courthouse door to wait for business to come his
way.4 Instead, a sheriff appeared, to whom Reed confided his career
ambitions and his purchase of a gun.249 At the sheriff's request, Reed

went home to get his gun and left it with the sheriff. 5 The jury acquitted
him.25'
For cases like Leroy Reed, jury-found culpability would remove a
common ground for jurors to nullify contrary to law. Because jury-found
culpability would allow a broader mental state inquiry, jurors could now
account in their verdict for the defendant's absence of a wrongful state of
mind. As John Parry suggests, "[i]f moral judgments are inevitable at
criminal trials, then the question is not whether to make such judgments,
but rather who should make them and what constraints to place upon

244. Paul Butler. Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJusticeSystem, 1o5
YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995); accord Andrew Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253,

253 (1996) ("Nullification occurs when the defendant's guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, but
the jury, based on its own sense of justice or fairness, decides to acquit."); see also Todd E. Pettys,
Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L.
(2001) (discussing variants of jury nullification).
245.

See, e.g.,

O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 112,

at

§ 12.01

REV.

467, 498

(2005); NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF

MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 3-I (2003).

246. See Brown, supra note 3, at 1239-49 (discussing case of Leroy Reed); Marder, supra note
at 923-25 (same).
247. Marder, supra note 112, at 890.

248. Id. at 89o-9i.
249. Id. at 891.
250. Id.
251. Id.

112,
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them."2 5

3. Notice and Legality
A third potential objection to jury-found culpability could be that its
more flexible approach contravenes accepted principles of notice and
legality-principles designed to assure that the citizenry is reasonably
apprised of the scope of conduct that is illegal. Although defendants
would not know exactly what facts the prosecution must prove that they
knew, defendants would receive the greater benefit of knowing that she
cannot be convicted at all unless found to have acted with knowledge
that they engaged in the type of wrong prohibited by the charged statute.
A defendant has no such assurance under the apparent innocence rule,
for which the courts determine on a statute-by-statute basis (perhaps for
the first time in a defendant's particular case) which element facts a
defendant must be proved to have known.
Jury-found culpability not only furnishes fair notice to criminal
defendants but also, as a practical matter, will likely dissuade prosecutors
from charging defendants with obscure regulatory crimes where the facts
suggest little likelihood that the defendant knew she was doing wrong.
To be sure, the criminal law justifiably serves a norm-changing function,
and sometimes prosecutors will charge crimes in order to change
concepts of moral wrongdoing, as with campaigns to prosecute "deadbeat dads" or drunk drivers. But jury-found culpability offers some
protection against prosecutors moving too quickly to seek criminal
penalties for the violation of counterintuitive or little-known rules.
For example, consider the case of Carlton Wilson, who was charged
with unlawful possession of a firearm by one who is subject to a domestic
protection order-a statute that was a "relatively new and obscure
portion" of the federal criminal code at the time that Wilson was arrested
in 1996."' One day Wilson stopped his truck by the side of the road, and
a police officer stopped to assist him. 54 When the officer ran a routine
check on Wilson's name, he learned that Wilson was subject to an arrest
warrant for failure to appear in court, and so he arrested him. 55 An
inventory search of Wilson's truck found two firearms and another
loaded handgun in a "fanny pack" that Wilson had been wearing.256
More than a year before Wilson's roadside encounter with the
252. John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 Hous.
L. REv. 397,460 (1999).
253. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1998). Violation of the statute. i8 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8), may result in a sentence of up to ten years' imprisonment. i8 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000).
The statute was enacted in 1994, and at the time of the Wilson case, "the number of prosecutions for

violating it ha[d] been miniscule." Wilson, 159 F.3d at 294 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 283 (majority opinion).
255. Id. at 284.
256. Id.
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police, he had appeared in state court where he consented to entry of a
two-year order of domestic protection from his ex-wife. 5 ' There was no
indication that Wilson's prior abuse of his ex-wife involved guns.s The
protection order was entered during the course of a ten minute hearing
in a state judge's chambers at which Wilson was not represented by a
lawyer." 9 Nor did the state judge place a checkmark in the boilerplate
portion of the protection order that would have required Wilson to
divest himself of any guns.2'6 Wilson was not otherwise told by the state
judge that he could not possess a gun. 6 , "The fact that the restraining
order contained no reference to guns may have lulled [Wilson] into
thinking that, as long as he complied with
' 6 the order and stayed away
from his wife, he could carry on as before.
Wilson's conviction and sentence of forty-one months' imprisonment
was affirmed by a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit. 63 The majority
reasoned that Wilson need only know the facts of his conduct (which it
was undisputed that he did-that he possessed a gun). 6 ' The court
rejected Wilson's due process claim on the ground that Wilson did not
have to know the law. 6 s
In dissent, then-Chief Judge Posner argued that, because of the
"knowing" requirement of the statute, it was a "linguistically permissible
interpretation of the statute" to require that the "government would
have to prove that he knew that continued possession of guns after the
restraining order was entered was a crime. '266 In Posner's view, Wilson
was the "classic unwarned defendant, ' 2 67 and his situation differed from
cases involving the violation of "law [that] is common knowledge, as in
the case of laws forbidding people to own hand grenades, forbidding
convicted felons to own any firearms, and requiring a license to carry a
handgun."'26
Posner's proposed solution to reinterpret the statute highlights the
weakness of the categorical statutory interpretation approach to
evaluating a criminal defendant's culpability. Under Posner's view,
Carlton Wilson should have been proved to know the wrongfulness of his
conduct, while a felon-in-possession defendant would not. Both criminal
257. Id. at n.i.
258. Id. at 294-95 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).

259. Id. at 284 (majority opinion); id. at 294 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
26o. Id. at 294.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 295.
263. Id. at 293.
264- Id. at 289 (majority opinion).
265. Id. at 288-89.
266. Id. at 296 (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 295 (internal citation omitted).
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provisions, however, are subsections of the same statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922.

They are both subject to the identical "knowingly violate" mental state
requirements of i8 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). No possible textual basis could
justify treating the knowledge requirements of these two statutes
differently in the way Posner proposed. The only reason to distinguish
the two statutes would be the relative novelty of the domestic-protectionorder provision. Yet, as the public over time became generally aware of
the domestic-protection-order prohibition, the statute would presumably
have to be "reinterpreted" again to be consistent with its companion
felon-in-possession provision-to require only that a defendant know the
facts of his conduct.
Jury-found culpability would solve this conundrum. It would leave it
to the jury to determine if the defendant knew he was engaged in the
type of wrongdoing prohibited by the statute. To make this decision, a
jury could factor in the novelty of a criminal prohibition and the degree
to which it could be said that a defendant like Carlton Wilson was fairly
on notice that he was doing wrong. This comports with Samuel Buell's
observation that "[e]ven if the criminal law's technical requirements for
notice are mostly constructive and fictional, a residual commitment
either to congruity between the criminal law and moral norms or to
actual notice of the law remains an essential feature of our ' polity's
69
account of minimal due process, at least in serious criminal cases.
A counterpart to Judge Posner's concern with the enforcement of
new criminal statutes is Judge Calabresi's concern for the validity of
obligations imposed by older statutes that, because of the passage of
time, can no longer be said to reflect the community's values (a
phenomenon he calls "statutorification").7 ° Among other measures,
Calabresi posits an affirmative "judicial sunsetting" role for the courts in
declining to enforce or apply time-worn statutes that have become
"sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework."27'
Whether the problem is criminal statutes that are too new or too old,
jury-found culpability redresses this issue in a manner that would neither
commit the courts to altering their interpretations of statutes over time
(as Posner would do for new and obscure statutes) or require courts to
decline to enforce some statutes (as Calabresi would do for obsolete
statutes). Juries would temper the application of these statutes on a caseby-case basis where unfairness to the defendant was clear.
It is not just that statutes change over time. What society considers
to be wrong also changes with time.272 Momentous events such as the

269. Samuel Buell, supra note 25, at 1981-82.
270. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES I (Harvard Univ. Press 1982).
271. Id. at 165-66.

272. See, e.g., Green, supra note 22, at 1555 ("[S]ociety's views of morality change over time and
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September i i terrorist attack or spates of student shootings in schools
may well color a judge or jury's evaluation of whether a defendant knew
his conduct to be wrongful. 73 Today, a defendant with a weapon in an
airplane or a school will be hard-pressed to claim that he was not aware
of its wrongfulness.
The apparent innocence rule cannot adjust over time with society's
evolving standards of wrongfulness. Because the apparent innocence rule
operates by means of interpreting a statute to require knowledge of
particular facts, the meaning of what facts connote wrongfulness is cast in
perpetuity as a matter of statutory interpretation and entitled to
continued adherence under stare decisis. By contrast, flexibility remains
under jury-found culpability for juries to exonerate defendants who did
not know they were doing wrong.
4. Jury-Found Culpability v. A Good Faith Defense
A final potential objection to jury-found culpability is whether there
is a more narrowly tailored alternative to redress the shortcomings of the
apparent innocence rule. For example, in cases where the defendant may
not have known he was doing wrong, why not simply allow the defendant
to raise and prove a "good faith" defense? 74 As it is now, good faith is
not ordinarily a defense to a general intent crime,275 and so allowance of a
good faith defense would require a change in present practice. But
placing the burden on the defendant of showing good faith would also
undermine the government's baseline burden to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Indeed, although a "good faith" defense is already
allowed for specific intent cases, the courts have made clear that proof of
good faith is not the defendant's burden; the burden at all times remains
on the prosecution to negate the defendant's good faith as part of its
obligation to establish that the defendant acted with specific intent.
Moreover, requiring the defendant to prove his own good faith
would be constitutionally problematic. The Constitution allows placing a
burden on the defendant to prove defenses that are collateral or
additional to the elements of the crime itself. For example, defenses such
...what one generation views as morally wrongful or socially harmful frequently deviates from the
views of an earlier or succeeding generation.").
273. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in9/I Cases. 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 959, 960 (2003) (discussing likely effects of 9/I terrorism, including juries' "increased tendency
to interpret ambiguous behavior as blameworthy").
274. Cf Leipold, supra note 244 , at 314-15 (proposing that legislatures create statutory jury
nullification defense in cases where the jury does not believe conduct occasioned the harm or risk
intended by a statute).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1031 (6th Cir. 1999). As noted in Part I, for
specific intent statutes and other general intent statutes where Congress requires "willful" conduct the
prosecution would be required to show the absence of good faith.
276. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, s85 F.3d 999. 1007 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Doyle,
13o F.3d 523, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1997).
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as necessity, duress, and self-defense are exculpatory because they
excuse or justify otherwise wrongful conduct; they do not negate a
defendant's knowledge that his conduct is otherwise wrong. For this
reason, in Dixon v. United States, the Supreme Court recently upheld a
requirement that a defendant prove duress, noting that the defense "may
excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but the existence of
duress normally does not controvert any of the elements of the offense
' The duress defense "allows the defendant to 'avoid liability...
itself."277
because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt
even though the necessary mens rea was present."'" 8 In contrast to
Dixon, to require a defendant generally to prove her own good faith in
general intent cases would saddle the defendant with disproving an
aspect of her own mens rea with respect to the factual elements of a
crime.
CONCLUSION

Consistent with the jury's central role to render judgment in criminal
cases, now is the time for the Court to revisit how juries resolve mens rea
for federal general intent crimes. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
development of the apparent innocence rule rests on its
acknowledgement of the primacy of protecting innocent conduct. Only
the Court's methodological approach of judicial element-by-element
interpretation stands in the way of protecting innocence-to allow a jury
to decide for each case if a defendant knew she was doing wrong.
The authentic innocence rule of jury-found culpability ensures a true
culpability inquiry. There is little reason to suppose that Congress
intends the conviction of the morally blameless. Nor should those who
are accused-and the juries who judge them-expect anything less.

277. Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2441 (2006).
278. Id. at 2442.

